A STUDY OF ROAD SAFETY LEAD AGENCIES IN AFRICA

Winnie Mitullah • Martin Small • Mustapha Azzouzi
The Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) is an international partnership to facilitate policy development and related capacity-building in the transport sector in Africa. Sound policies lead to safe, reliable, and cost-effective transport, freeing people to lift themselves out of poverty and helping countries to compete internationally. More publications are found on the SSATP website: www.ssatp.org.

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# Table of Contents

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

**ABOUT THE AUTHORS**

**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

**2. METHODOLOGY**

2.1. Phase 1: Research Instrument Preparation and Agency Selection

2.2. Phase 2: Data Collection and Analysis

2.3. Lessons

**3. THE LEAD AGENCY IN AFRICA**

3.1 Institutional Form

3.2 Institutional Function

3.3 Institutional Performance

3.4 Lead Agencies Elsewhere

**4. LEAD AGENCY PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA**

4.1 Institutions

4.2 Results Focus

4.3 Coordination and Promotion

4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

4.5 Funding and Capacity

4.6 Performance

**5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Lesson 1: Institutional Mandate

Lesson 2: Results Focus

Lesson 3: Coordination

Lesson 4: Funding

Lesson 5: Monitoring and Evaluation

Lesson 6: Capacity Building

**APPENDICES**

Appendix A: RSLA Questionnaire

Appendix B: Stakeholder Focus Group Checklist

Appendix C: Legal Mandates for Road Safety Lead Agencies

**REFERENCES**
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Road Safety Outcome Connections across Sectors .................................................. 19
Figure 2.1: WHO Estimated Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2016 ......................................... 25
Figure 3.1: WHO Estimated Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2010–16 ................................. 31
Figure 4.1: Establishment and Operational Year of Participant RSLAs ..................................... 35
Figure 4.2: Legal Establishment and Existence of a Guiding Document .................................. 36
Figure 4.3: Main Activities of RSLA Work Groups ................................................................... 37
Figure 4.4: Existence of a National Road Safety Strategy or Action Plan ................................. 39
Figure 4.5: Alignment of National Strategies ............................................................................ 39
Figure 4.6: Final Safety Outcomes ............................................................................................. 40
Figure 4.7: Periodic Legislation Reviews ...................................................................................... 41
Figure 4.8: Existence and Legal Status of National Interagency Bodies .................................... 43
Figure 4.9: RSLA Rating of Interagency Bodies ......................................................................... 44
Figure 4.10: Coordination Mandate and Status .......................................................................... 44
Figure 4.11: RSLA Rating of Effectiveness of Their Coordination with Stakeholders .............. 45
Figure 4.12: Type of Data Gathered and Shared across Agencies .............................................. 50
Figure 4.13: Accuracy, Production of Reports, and Deaths within 30 Days ............................... 51
Figure 4.14: Conduct and Funding of Evaluations ..................................................................... 53
Figure 4.15: Main Revenue and Funding Sources for RSLA Budget ......................................... 55
Figure 4.16: Main Road Safety Funders ..................................................................................... 55
Figure 4.17: Satisfaction of Funding and Proportion of Required Resources, 2020/21 ............. 57
Figure 4.18: Total RSLA Technical Staff .................................................................................... 57
Figure 4.19: RSLA Rating of Funding Priorities ......................................................................... 58
Figure 4.20: RSLA Rating of Factors Affecting Performance ...................................................... 60
Figure 4.21: RSLA Rating of Their Own Overall Performance .................................................. 61
LIST OF BOXES

Box 4.1: Good Practice: Road Safety Strategy, Mali ................................................................. 42
Box 4.2: Good Practice: Governance and Coordination, Morocco and Nigeria .......................... 48
Box 4.3: Good Practice: Sustainable Funding ........................................................................... 59

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2.1: Countries Included in the Study ........................................................................... 23
Table 4.1: Existence and Nature of National Strategies and Plans ........................................ 40
Table 4.2: Ratio of WHO Estimated Fatalities to Reported Fatalities, 2010–16 .................... 52
Table 4.3: Amount Allocated to RSLAs, US$ ......................................................................... 56
Table 4.4: Agency Strength across Programs and Systems .................................................. 62
The study project was led by Tawia Addo-Ashong, Senior Transport Specialist at the World Bank and Road Safety Pillar Lead for SSATP, Girma Bezabeh, Road Safety Specialist at the African Development Bank, and Meleckidze Deck Khayesi at the World Health Organization, who each provided critical support and direction. The project was possible through the support of the Global Road Safety Facility with funding from UKAid. The following people supported data in-country gathering: Shehab Abuzeid, Juliet Adu, Yonas Bekele, Dr. Antole Desire Bizongo, Pedro Chilengue, Martial M. Missimikim, Racheal Nganwa, Patrick Omari, Okwudili N. Ikejiani, Hammami Sassi, Sidiki Sidibe, Ndupewa Hileni Tjivikua, Elna Van Niekerk. Finally, the study would not have been possible without the support and contribution of the road safety lead agencies themselves—they have a complex task in a complex environment, and it is the study team’s hope that this report can support their future efforts.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Winnie Mitullah is a research professor based at the University of Nairobi, Institute for Development Studies (IDS). She has a background in political science and public administration specializing on policy, institutions, and governance, in particular provision and management of urban services, including decentralization, housing, informality, transport, and identity. Mitullah has researched, published, taught, consulted, and collaborated with several academic colleagues across countries and continents, governments, private sector, the United Nations, and other local and international agencies. Her publications include road safety and nonmotorized transport.

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### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FRSC</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
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<td>RSLA</td>
<td>Road Safety Lead Agency</td>
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<td>UN</td>
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Road traffic fatalities and injuries are a global concern acknowledged in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), an African concern acknowledged in the African Road Safety Charter, and a national concern acknowledged in various country policies and laws. Road safety lead agencies (RSLAs) are responsible for leading national efforts to achieve the national road safety goals, bringing all arms of government and society together to improve safety outcomes. Despite the presence of these agencies in most countries, road safety performance remains a concern—management systems are inadequate and interventions are weak—justifying this examination of the performance of RSLAs in 16 anglophone and francophone countries of Africa, using quantitative and qualitative methods. The study was commissioned by the Global Road Safety Facility through the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank as part of a global study on RSLAs by the World Health Organization (WHO).

RSLAs in Africa operate in different legal and institutional contexts, which is reflected in the differentiated performance of various functions that are analyzed in this study. The analysis reveals that the agencies’ performances are undermined by regulatory weaknesses and resource scarcity.
Institutions

The RSLAs operate under different institutional forms: seven agencies identified themselves as government departments, five as autonomous agencies, and the remainder as councils with a professional secretariat. Several have strong legal mandates backed by acts of Parliament and hold major delivery responsibilities, and the level of mandate improves with establishment of autonomous agencies, but there is a widespread need to strengthen legal mandates for road safety. Ten agencies have road safety policy documents to guide them, but none of the councils do, revealing a weakness in the council form. All but one of the RSLAs were established by a specific law referencing their road safety responsibility. Three-quarters of the countries have interagency bodies, a few of which have multiple bodies that extend to local government and into technical bodies. While the literature and practitioners are concerned about which institutional form of organization is appropriate, this study does not allow a conclusion on the preferred form of an RSLA. Each country’s government system has evolved in its own way, at different times, and in response to different factors, and it is more important to consider current institutional settings for road safety in a country, and to assess how those settings can be improved, than to define the best form.

Results Focus

RSLAs are responsible for leading national efforts to achieve the national road safety goals. National road safety strategies and plans provide mechanisms for national, regional, and local stakeholders to agree on a roadmap for action to reduce fatal and serious injuries, and to determine what will be done by whom and how. The study findings show that country strategies are aligned with global and continental frameworks, but the delivery of road safety activities in line with safety goals and targets are unsatisfactory. There is a mismatch between the theoretical ambition and road safety activities set at the national level and the actual implementation of road safety activities. Most countries only include deaths and serious injuries in the final safety outcomes. Other final safety outcomes like hospitalization and economic cost of crashes that are embedded in global guidelines are hardly included. Furthermore, not all stakeholders (particularly those outside government) use national strategies to achieve road safety objectives and goals. These challenges are further complicated by a lack of stable and sufficient funding. Sustained investment is required in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to track progress at the national level, short of which progress to achieve fatality and serious targets will continue to be compromised. Many opportunities exist in ensuring safer roads/vehicles/users and improved post-crash response, and strategies and plans need to be continually reviewed and aligned with international guidance and good practice.

Coordination and Promotion

RSLAs are responsible for bringing on board stakeholders from inside and outside government, coordinating and aligning road safety interventions and management functions to support the achievement of national targets. This requires leveraging the different strengths and capacities of stakeholders for successful implementation of strategies and plans. The study reveals not only national interagency bodies that can support this but also government agencies with overlapping responsibilities and no clear coordination mechanism. Outside government, there is little coordination, and most stakeholders feel disconnected from the national road safety efforts. In isolated cases where coordination exists, it is usually based on individual initiatives as opposed to any institutionalized mechanism. Stakeholders attribute coordination weaknesses to several factors: any input is at an advisory level only with agencies who do not hold themselves to commitments, and there is a lack of data to inform decisions, a lack of technical expertise to develop programs, and a lack of funding to implement programs. The private sector and civil society organizations (CSOs) need to become part of the national road safety effort, which will require strengthening coordination arrangements, including the establishment of working groups.

The coordination issues are directly affecting the road safety promotion function, which should be done at both strategic and programmatic levels. RSLAs should be promoting road safety knowledge—including policies, laws, regulations, strategic plans, and targets—among all stakeholders and coordinating promotional activities geared toward achieving road safety goals. The findings show that most stakeholders plan their activities
individually with hardly any consultation, at most inviting others to participate in their activities. A coordinated approach has the potential to deliver high-priority promotional activities that focus on building support for implementation across the country of major safety reforms.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Road safety data (i) unearth the extent of the problems; (ii) inform development of road safety policies; (iii) assist in monitoring trends; (iv) assist in identifying high-risk road user groups, location, and risk factors influencing road traffic injury; and (v) provide knowledge for road safety organizations, and overall evaluation of road safety performance. The study reveals that few RSLAs are directly in charge of data, but it reinforces their responsibility to ensure that the systems are in place to effectively monitor and evaluate road safety progress. The M&E function is weak in most of the case study countries: mainly only data on fatalities and injuries are collected; underlying data related to intermediate indicators and risk factors such as speeding, drink driving, motorcycle helmet use, and infrastructure safety are largely not collected. Furthermore, most countries do not have centralized crash data, and RSLAs and stakeholders do not consider death and injury reporting accurate. Countries need to strengthen the RSLA’s capacity to effectively coordinate and manage road safety data systems and develop a reliable M&E system to promote safety performance indicators. While privacy controls are essential, all government stakeholders need to share data, and performance data should be regularly published.

Funding and Capacity

Funding and human resources present critical challenges that undermine the performance of RSLAs. A critical role for lead agencies is to lead analysis and discussion to determine what significant additional safety investments are required, how they will be funded, and how they will be managed. The study shows that RSLAs are performing below average, with limited funds and human resources, which undermine their ability to effectively fulfill their mandated functions. Funding is largely provided by national treasuries and respective ministries, with multilateral banks and foreign donors complementing government efforts. Nine of the study countries had road funds in addition to other funding sources, but only one country had sufficient budget for 2020/21. The lack of funding impacts on human resources, manifested in the shortfall between the number of positions established by an RSLA and the number of people actually employed. Countries need to pursue more sustainable funding sources and greater priority for safety investments, which are needed to reduce the funding gap. In particular (and with regard to both RSLA institutional and wider sectoral needs), countries should identify the economic cost of road traffic crashes, the financial and human resources required, and the potential funding sources, and develop investment business cases. This will strengthen RSLA and partner delivery of more and better interventions.

Performance

Measuring performance is essential, but it is not easy to measure the performance of RSLAs. At a country level, overall performance must be measured in terms of deaths and serious injuries, but several factors that directly affect performance go beyond the powers, functions, and resources of RSLAs. Road safety performance at a national level is a shared outcome across at least the transport, justice, and health sectors. In this study, the RSLAs’ self-assessment identified funding as the most problematic constraint to their performance, followed by ineffective enforcement of regulations, system constraints, lack of data, and lack of up-to-date legislation. Legal constraint was identified as the least problematic challenge (rating 2.7 out of 5 in a Likert scale), but the study revealed significant gaps in this area.

Lessons and Recommendations

Six lessons were drawn from this study, and recommendations made, focusing on countries. It is also recommended that development partners undertake a follow-up study in the middle of the Second Decade of Action for Road Safety and initiate the preparation of a guidance manual for road safety lead agencies.
Lesson 1. Institutional Mandate: The safety mandate is important to establish at an early point, and it needs to be renewed. It must be continually nourished and never forgotten.

It is recommended that countries review and, if necessary, enhance the legislative mandate of the lead agency, the wider interagency governance systems for road safety, and the engagement with stakeholders outside government in pursuit of national road safety goals.

Lesson 2. Results Focus: Strategy development and implementation processes are a critical means of a lead agency bringing something to the table, establishing their credibility and delivering improved safety.

It is recommended that countries review alignment with good practice road safety strategies and plans and ensure that core interventions (the safety quality of the road, of vehicles, of users, and of post-crash response) are appropriately applied to the local context—special consideration is required of the political and cultural context in each country, the economic and commercial factors at play, the importance of compliance with safety standards, and appropriate licensing arrangements for informal/public transport.

Lesson 3. Coordination: Establishing and maintaining stakeholder engagement processes is time-consuming and difficult but essential to the long-term value that the RSLA can deliver.

It is recommended that countries strengthen road safety governance arrangements to ensure that nonstate actors in the academic, business, and civil society sectors are engaged in developing and implementing road safety strategy and can better align their own safety interests and activities to the directions being pursued at a national level.

Lesson 4. Funding: Sustainable funding sources for the RSLA and for the safety programs being delivered by other ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) need to be considered as a critical governance and institutional issue.

It is recommended that countries pursue more sustainable funding sources and greater priority for safety investments, which are needed to reduce the significant funding gap reported by almost all RSLAs, and for the wider sector (in road infrastructure, vehicle regulation, post-crash services, and so on) to meet national road safety targets.

Lesson 5. Monitoring and Evaluation: Direct involvement in road safety data management is important for RSLAs to deliver their wider leadership role.

It is recommended that countries strengthen RSLA capacity to effectively collect and manage road safety data and develop a reliable evaluation and monitoring system to promote safety performance indicators—while privacy controls are essential, all government stakeholders need to share data, and performance data need to be regularly published.

Lesson 6. Capacity Building: Capacity building is a critical and ongoing consideration as the RSLA is established, grows, and leads the national road safety effort.

It is recommended that countries look for opportunities to systematically strengthen capacity building in local and national safety expertise, focusing on the quality of human resources and their technical expertise, and on the capacity of the national road safety management system rather than the number of staff.
1. INTRODUCTION

This study of road safety lead agencies (RSLAs) in Africa takes place at an important time when serious injuries on roads are at the center of discussions on sustainable development. RSLAs are considered to be critical vehicles for responding to road safety challenges, although how well they do this in Africa remains largely unknown. In literature, their functionality, complexity, and autonomy has widely been assessed (AfDB 2013; Small and Runji 2014; WHO 2018; Cardoso et al. 2018). However, few studies have attempted to link the management capacity of RSLAs to the observed road safety outcomes such as serious injuries and fatality reduction or the reduction in the cost of road traffic crashes. Consequently, there is limited evidence as to whether lead agencies in Africa are achieving the intended goals of improving road safety status (Bajia et al. 2021).
Growing global recognition of the need to release the hand brake of road traffic injury on sustainable development has led to several global responses:

- The inclusion of road safety as a target in the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals
- The promulgation of the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2021–2030
- The release of a global plan to support the implementation of a second decade of action
- The establishment of voluntary road safety performance targets to support the 2030 target of a 50 percent reduction in fatalities
- The establishment of a UN Road Safety Fund to catalyze investment and finance high-impact, scalable projects

At a continental level, it is important that African countries draw on this unprecedented level of global attention and reinforce the importance of it across the continent. The adoption of the African Road Safety Charter and the establishment of the African Road Safety Observatory under the leadership of the African Union will be important in this. Nationally, the strengthening of institutional responses to the road safety crisis by African governments will be even more important.

The above global, regional, and local concerns justify the overall research objective of this study, to assess the organizational performance of RSLAs in Africa. This study aims to generate knowledge on the strengths and weaknesses of road safety institutions and to identify directions toward improved performance.

Governments play a critical and defining role in the road traffic system and the safety of that system. They raise revenue; allocate resources for safety programs; set the safety standards for roads, vehicles, and users; enforce compliance with those standards; and have emergency medical systems in place for road crash victims. They rely on contributions from many different societal actors, but the quality of those actors’ response reflects the quality of government leadership.

Governments have the means at their disposal to reduce serious road trauma, but it can be difficult to continually achieve this. There are many variables to manage within the road traffic system, which is impacted upon by various legal, financial, and commercial imperatives. The road traffic system is also expected to support much bigger social, environmental, and economic goals within society. Three major government sectors, for example—health, transport, and police—all focus on higher level outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, but hold significant road safety responsibilities.
Given the highly dispersed nature of the road traffic system and the many different accountabilities for safety, considerable effort and attention is required to ensure a systemic, multisectoral, and successful response to the societal goal of eliminating road traffic injury.

Two institutional primary responses are required by government. The first is to put in place interagency governance systems to manage the various responsibilities and accountabilities of ministers, and their respective ministries, departments, and agencies (MDA). Effective interagency governance systems help governments make better policy and investment decisions in pursuit of societal goals. They also help governments hold MDA to account for delivering the specific services for which they are responsible and for coordinating delivery with other relevant MDA in pursuit of those goals.

The second institutional response is to nominate a lead agency within central government to lead the road safety effort. This was an original recommendation in the World Health Organization’s World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention (Peden et al. 2004). The RSLA can support the interagency governance system, bring together a single line of road safety advice to ministers, and coordinate and follow up on the implementation of decided actions. A professional work group to perform this function can be housed within an existing agency, or an autonomous agency can be established.

The RSLA function is a complex one within a complex system, and the focus of this study is the performance of this function in Africa. African countries have established management systems for road safety as a way of implementing the recommendations of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety, and the Africa Road Safety Action Plan (Peden et al. 2004; UNECA 2011; WHO 2013). Articles 4 and 5 of the African Road Safety Charter reinforce the importance of the RSLAs:

1. State Parties shall establish legally mandated national road safety lead agencies with cross-sectorial coordination responsibilities within three years after the ratification or accession to this Charter.
2. The responsibilities of the lead agencies shall among others include:
   a. Policy advice to Government on matters of road safety across sectors; and
   b. Formulation and coordination of the implementation of road safety strategies.

The charter was adopted by the African Union on January 30, 2016. It has been signed by 12 of the 55 member countries (Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zambia) and ratified by two (Mali and Namibia).

All but three of the 50 African countries that participated in the most recent World Health Organization (WHO) survey published in 2018 reported having a road safety lead agency. However, the existence of a lead agency does not mean that it has the required legal authority or the financial or human resources needed to execute its intended mandate. As well, there may or may not be an interagency governing body or wider stakeholder body through which key interests are brought together to provide advice and direction for government. Without these outward-focused engagement systems, the RSLA is likely to find it more difficult to succeed in what is already a complex environment.

These governance, mandate, and resourcing challenges are not unique to Africa, or indeed low- and middle-income countries, but the African context is more challenging. For example, it has been argued that colonial rule in Africa left a legacy of much stronger informal institutions on the continent, which has impacted on the ability of formal government institutions to effect change (Bajia, Mitullah, and Azzouzi 2021). Against this background, African RSLAs face further and more specific challenges, such as the following:

- **Income imperatives:** Poverty issues loom much larger, with many people forced to take unreasonably high risks on the road to earn income—for example, hawking in motorized traffic or the nonmotorized carriage of goods that spill into traffic.
- **Regulatory weaknesses:** Safety reform is more difficult in Africa where highly competitive and informal or poorly regulated public transport industries play a dominant role in personal mobility.
- **Resource scarcity:** Safety investment is often not tangible and obvious, which means that very low national budgets in Africa make competition for safety investment even greater, reducing the potential effectiveness of lead agencies.

RSLAs in high-income countries can find it difficult to effectively work across sectors and organizational boundaries and even the best organized look to renew and refresh their approach. RSLAs in African countries face even more difficulties but are even more crucial to success in responding to the road safety crisis sweeping the continent.

This study sought to better understand these difficulties and the potential steps to success for African RSLAs. It was commissioned by the Global Road Safety Facility through the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the World Bank and focuses on 16 African countries. It is part of a global study of road safety lead agencies being undertaken by the World Health Organization.

The study is structured into four sections. Section 2 describes the two-phase methodology—desk study and preparation of the research instruments, data collection and analysis. Section 3 discusses the concept of lead agency, laying the ground for the presentation of the study results regarding lead agency performance in section 4. Section 4 ends by responding to the following research questions that informed the study:

1. What are the organizational and performance characteristics of effective lead agencies?
2. How do these characteristics manifest themselves in lead agencies in low- and middle-income (African) countries?
3. Under what circumstances is one model of organization more appropriate than the other?
4. To what extent does the mechanism by which they are set up and their capacity address their effectiveness for leading and coordinating road safety stakeholders and deliver their mandate of achieving national and SDG road safety targets?
5. How do these agencies work out the “good practice” with respect to governance, funding, and responsibilities to deliver their mandate?
6. What strategic appropriate reform measures should be adopted to improve the effectiveness of lead agencies in low- and middle-income countries?

Section 5 identifies lessons from the study and makes recommendations to improve lead agency performance.
The study was divided into two distinct phases. The first phase was designed to establish the context of RSLAs in Africa, identify knowledge gaps, and inform the second phase of the study, including the selection of the 16 case study countries and the development of research tools. The second phase consisted of data collection and analysis.
Phase 1 began with the development of analytical framework for desk study. This was followed by a review of the literature and report writing. Published literature was reviewed, including that produced by governments and multilateral institutions. The review focused on the political context and age of RSLAs, policy and legal and institutional frameworks, organizational and human capacity, coordination, and performance indicators.

The resulting report (Bajia, Mitullah, and Azzouzi 2021) provided a knowledge base for the study and was used to inform the selection of the lead agencies for analysis. Countries were selected based on the following factors:
- The geographic spread of countries across the primary regions of Africa
- The official nonlocal language used in each country
- The wealth of each country
- The population and road safety performance (WHO 2016 estimates).

<table>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This provided a good mix of RSLAs across the continent, including both French- and English-speaking countries, with their unique attributes (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). Income status was considered vital since literature revealed that many agencies have limited resources, in particular finance and human resources. Literature attributed this to weak institutions and lack of political support, which are assessed in this study.

A questionnaire was developed and circulated to each RSLA (Appendix A). It was informed by the terms of reference and the literature review and included questions relevant for a comprehensive understanding of RSLA operations in each country: institutional information, legal framework, organization, national interagency body, coordination, national strategy and planning, legislation, data, monitoring and evaluation, funding, human resources, and performance.

Although some of the questions covered other MDA, such as highways or police, these were limited to matters that were considered relevant for the RSLA in relationship to those MDA. Some information was needed from other agencies, but the questionnaire was designed for the RSLA to respond directly, and to consult other MDA where needed.

In addition to the questionnaire, a checklist of issues (Appendix B) was developed for focus group discussions (FGDs), to assist in gathering collective voices of stakeholders on road safety issues. The issues to discuss included familiarity with road safety issues, national road safety strategy and targets, engagement with road safety agencies, stakeholder engagement with RSLA, coordination of road safety actors by RSLA, road safety information data gathering and sharing, road safety funding and technical support, and overall assessment of RSLA performance. The aim was to review the completed questionnaires before the FGDs, but most RSLAs experienced delays in responding to them.

### 2.2. Phase 2: Data Collection and Analysis

Primary data gathering for this study was complex and included the recruitment of a research assistant in each country (however, one research assistant covered both Morocco and Tunisia, and another covered both Chad and Côte d’Ivoire). Each research assistant was responsible for identifying key stakeholders for FGDs, conducting FGDs, writing a report, and following up on the questionnaire being completed by the RSLA.

Prior to the data-gathering work, several materials were prepared for the research assistants and shared with them before their training, which was conducted online:

- The tasks for completion by the research assistant
- A briefing note on RSLAs, providing conceptual understanding of their role
- Fieldwork instructions outlining how to constitute and run an FGD
- Drafts of an invitation letter and a briefing note for FGD participants

The materials aimed to equip the research assistants with knowledge of the subject matter and expectations of the assignment. The training helped ensure that all the research assistants had a common understanding of the data being gathered, in particular clarity and meaning of various questions in the questionnaire and issues for FGDs.

Fieldwork relied on a co-production approach. The three consultants were responsible for overseeing data collection in respective countries, working closely with the RSLAs and the research assistants. The research assistants conducted the FGDs and oversaw administration of the RSLA questionnaire. In some cases where the FGDs were online, the researchers joined the country teams. World Bank and African Development Bank staff provided ongoing monitoring through meetings, oversight, support, and inputs, while WHO provided inputs to the research and writing process.
Figure 2.1: WHO Estimated Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2016

Source: WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety 2018
2.2.1 | Focus Group Discussions

FGDs were conducted across the 16 sampled countries. The FGD participants were drawn from a variety of road safety stakeholder groups:

- Development partners such as WHO, AfDB, World Bank, European Union, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and UNHABITAT
- Civil society organizations working on road safety
- Private sector alliances, chambers of commerce, and public transport companies
- Scholars from higher learning institutions and think tanks engage on road safety
- Road safety partner agencies such as highways, police, health, and local government

A minimum of two participants from each category was sought, with participants in each country FGD ranging from 8 to 15. Because COVID-19 impacted the countries differently, the FGDs were delivered in a hybrid mix—either/or/both online and physical.

2.2.2 | Semi-structured Questionnaire

A semi-structured questionnaire was administered to each RSLA. The RSLAs coordinated with other government agencies in their countries as required to respond to corresponding sections of the questionnaire, supported by the research assistants. Once the questionnaires were completed, the researchers reviewed them and identified any gaps.

Most of the questionnaires had gaps because the data were either lacking, not easily accessible, or too difficult to put together within the period of the research. Notwithstanding the gaps, the information generated from the questionnaires, complemented by the FGDs and materials drawn from the desk study, was sufficient for assessing the performance of RSLAs and writing the report.

2.2.3 | Data Analysis

Analysis of the questionnaires was done centrally by the researchers using appropriate software. Three essential steps took place during the data analysis process: (i) data validation and organization, (ii) editing and categorization, and (iii) data analysis, as illustrated below.

Data analysis was done after the validation and editing of data. This was followed by a deeper analysis involving converting data in several ways, including plotting data on a graph, examining the correlations, and creating pivot tables. Descriptive statistics helped describe the data and inferential statistics helped compare data.

Thematic content analysis was used to analyze data from the FGDs. This required keen reading of interview notes generated from each FGD and isolating key variables of analysis in line with the research issues. Once all 16 FGD reports were ready, a summarized consolidated FGD report was written by the research team to constitute a consolidated FGD research output.
2.3. Lessons

The research was interesting and informative but very challenging, largely due to the different protocols in undertaking studies in different countries. Our assumption that working directly with RSLAs would fast-track the research process was not borne out in some countries. This resulted in more time being dedicated to fieldwork, with the consequences of delay and request for extension of consultant contracts. A second lesson is the dearth of comprehensive data in some countries. While it is not possible to make conclusions on this matter, some countries seem to have data, but the data are not stored in a system that can easily be accessed. Some of the information required needed more than one government agency, which took longer than expected. Last, but not least, relying on RSLAs for information on their performance has limitations in respect to methodology. It was initially envisaged that key informant interviews in each country would complement the information from the RSLAs, but limited resources precluded these interviews from taking place.
3. **THE LEAD AGENCY IN AFRICA**

This section considers the concept of the RSLAs in Africa in terms of institutional form, function, and performance, as well as looks more broadly at lead agencies in other low- and middle-income countries.
3.1. Institutional Form

RSLAs in Africa are generally but not exclusively part of a government’s transport portfolio, or related public works or infrastructure portfolios. At the apex sits a ministry that typically comprises different departments or directorates. Whether they are small policy agencies or large operational agencies, they provide the closest and most direct association with the responsible government minister.

An advantage for road safety of having a ministry being the nominated road safety lead agency is that a responsible minister who gives clear priority to road safety can achieve a lot. A disadvantage for road safety is that the issue can get lost in a myriad of ministerial ad hoc committees or fluid organizational accountabilities that are geared to responding to particular government priorities of the day. This dichotomy applies broadly across public sector management.

Many African governments have established separate transport agencies with powers vested in boards appointed by ministers to oversee a legally defined institutional mandate. These agencies may be vested with significant independent investigation or regulatory powers, working in association within the framework of international maritime or aviation conventions. Good examples of this in Africa are air accident investigation agencies and maritime agencies that oversee port state control of international shipping.

Within road transport, the Road Management Initiative led by the Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) promoted major institutional reform during the 1990s and saw the establishment of separate road authorities in many African countries. The intention of these operational agencies was to improve, through the application of commercial disciplines, accountability and delivery associated with developing and maintaining national road networks. A related reform saw the establishment of national road funds. These funding agencies receive dedicated revenues (from government budgets, fuel levies, fees and charges, and so on) and allocate funding to the maintenance of those networks. Some dedicate a funding allocation to road safety activity.

National road authorities and road funds, with their well-established governance, legal mandates, and sustainable funding mechanisms, provide an important reference point for RSLAs. Over time, these road agencies have become increasingly influential in the quality of the road traffic system and have established processes and priorities that outlast any one minister or organizational leader.

A third common example in Africa of institutional response to road safety issues is the establishment of coordinating bodies or councils. Some of these entities have been well established, have a professional secretariat, and represented an essential step forward by governments to tackle road traffic injury. Some are better considered to be an interagency body rather than an agency, which is itself mandated and resourced to lead the national road safety effort, and so are best seen as a stepping-stone toward a more sustainable institutional response.

These three lead agency types—government department, autonomous agency, coordinating body—were identified previously as having a particular relevance in Africa (Small and Runji 2014), and provide the institutional basis from which this study was undertaken. There are variants in these agency types, and different capacities and capabilities, which reflects the national and governmental context in which they were established or currently exist. To begin consideration of performance, it is necessary to look at the core functions of an RSLA.

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3.2. Institutional Function

The road safety problem is not confined to Africa or to low- and middle-income countries; many high-income countries struggle with institutional responses to the problem. For a variety of cultural, national, and governmental reasons, road safety lead agencies may or may not perform all the institutional road safety management functions that are considered relevant to the potential success of a lead agency (Bajia et al. 2021). These functions are broadly described below (Bliss and Breen 2013):

- **Results focus:** Specify an agreed and cohesive direction regarding the overall safety ambition (vision, goals, targets), the actions required to achieve this ambition, and a performance management framework that links delivery of interventions and achievement of intermediate and final outcomes (this is the foremost function).

- **Coordination:** Develop and coordinate implementation of the government's national road safety strategies and plans through MDA that form part of an overall governance system, which also involves ongoing engagement with stakeholders.

- **Legislation:** Regularly review, develop, and maintain a legislative program focusing on the safety standards and compliance requirements that apply to roads, vehicles, and road users, as well as road safety management and emergency response systems.

- **Promotion:** Promote a systems-based response to road safety issues from government and the wider business and community sectors which are in a position to significantly improve the safety of road users.

- **Funding:** Ensure that advice is provided to government (including finance ministries) on resourcing requirements to achieve road safety targets, and the development and management of medium- and long-term road safety investment plans.

- **Monitoring and evaluation:** Develop and oversee implementation of a M&E framework, including good data management systems and a monitoring program associated with agreed safety performance factors and program deliverables.

- **Research and development, and capacity building:** Promote ongoing investment in road safety research and development, projects to demonstrate significant road safety advances that are needed, and road safety capacity-building programs across government agencies and within particular professions.

The performance of the lead agency in these functions can vary from time to time. A challenge for the agency is to have developed policies, processes, and procedures that allow the functions to be performed consistently at a high level (Muhlrad, Gitelman, and Buttler 2011). These functions performed through policies, processes and procedures essentially define the quality boundaries for a national road safety management system.

Road safety differs from many other public management endeavors in two main ways. First, whereas government agencies are by instinct more comfortable with being held accountable for delivery of outputs, and may describe outcomes in ways that are difficult to measure, there is no hiding from the number of fatal and serious road traffic injuries as a clearly definable outcome measure. Second, as noted previously, a great number of players (within government, let alone society) are engaged in activity that directly impacts upon that outcome. This makes it difficult to assess RSLA performance.
It is possible to compare road safety performance across countries, in public health terms, using WHO’s fatality estimates, as is done in Figure 3.1. Establishing a link between this performance and the performance of each RSLA suggests some precision about the observable differences in lead agency function, structure and resources between, for example, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is difficult to link the performance of the RSLA in each country with this overall performance as the actual volume or rate of road traffic injury depends on a number of factors.

**Figure 3.1: WHO Estimated Fatalities per 100,000 Population, 2010–16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety (2012, 2015, 2018)*
These factors include the following:

- External factors, over which the organization itself has no direct control, but that constrain the way the organization can operate—an example would be a simple lack of political backing for road safety, or the allocation of budget to other things.

- Institutional factors, including organizational and managerial arrangements, finance, human resources—an example would be the legal mandate of the lead agency compared with other responsible agencies in government.

- Technical factors, which relate to the agency’s capability to scope, promote and support major change leadership projects—an example would be the road safety knowledge within the agency, or the leadership capability of the executive.

A complementary approach has been taken to assess performance across the agencies, including an assessment by the researchers of lead agency performance in relation to the following eight programs and systems, based on the questionnaires and stakeholder focus group discussions:

1. (Results focus) The existence of a modern national road safety policy, strategy and/or action plan
2. (Coordination) A road safety governance system with an interagency body and stakeholder engagement
3. (Legislation) Recent and/or regular reviews of significant legislation and compliance issues
4. (Promotion) Regular promotion of road safety among key stakeholders and decision-makers
5. (Funding) A defined role in allocating safety resources across government and the community
6. (Monitoring and evaluation) A demonstrable focus on improving the quality of crash data
7. (Monitoring and evaluation) A program of monitoring road safety performance factors and deliverables
8. (Research and development and knowledge transfer) Regular research, development and capacity-building projects.

This assessment is reported at the end of section 4.

### 3.4. Lead Agencies Elsewhere

Finally, it is necessary to consider this in terms of road safety lead agencies in low- and middle-income countries outside Africa. In a global analysis of RLSAs, informed by a desktop study and field interviews with 32 RSLAs in low- and middle-income countries, WHO (2021) identified several findings:

- The impact of the presence of a RSLA on traffic fatality risk is not evident.
- There is no single organizational model utilized in these countries, and the contextual factors that determine these organizational models and how these models influence results merits further research.
- Most RSLAs are involved in coordination, policy planning, public outreach, capacity building, and data management systems. Most countries reported success in coordination, public outreach, legislation, and data management systems.
- Most countries also reported obstacles associated with a lack of funding, technical capacity and credible data, and reported advocating for and safeguarding road safety funding as a particular challenge.

These findings are relevant for our understanding of RSLAs in Africa and in high-income countries, which are bounded by the similarities they share rather than the contextual differences they face alone. Examples of two lead agencies are briefly noted below.

Serbia’s Road Traffic Safety Agency was established by law in 2009, and became operational 10 months later in September 2010, to establish a road traffic safety system that prevents road crashes and reduces the consequences of road crashes. The agency consists of five departments: Drivers Department, Vehicles Department, Research Department, Planning and Local Self-Governments Department, and Department of Legal, Financial and General Activities. The Road Traffic Safety Coordination Body became operational 12 months later; its main objective is to achieve cooperation and coordination of road safety, the initiation

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and monitoring of road safety activities, and the preparation of the National Road Traffic Safety Strategy and the National Road Traffic Safety Plan. The coordination body includes various responsible ministers and has seven expert working groups.

In India, the RLSA is the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH). The National Road Safety Council was established in 1991; it is chaired by the minister of road transport and highways and has a very wide membership, including representatives of states, which hold considerable responsibilities for road safety in their own right. There has also been heavy reliance on the oversight of the Supreme Court of India, which has been issuing road safety management directions to the states on various issues.

Legislation passed in 2019 includes provision for a National Road Safety Management Board that will do the following:

- Coordinate and monitor road safety activities in all states.
- Regulate motor vehicles and drivers.
- Set standards for traffic management and road safety.
- Prepare guidelines for road safety capacity building and skills development.
- Prepare guidelines for trauma and paramedical facilities.
- Provide technical advice and assistance to public authorities on road safety and traffic management.

The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways has advanced several major safety issues, in particular vehicle safety regulation, but the establishment of the board is expected to lift performance further.
4.

LEAD AGENCY PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA

Road safety lead agencies in the 16 countries engaged in this study operate in different legal and institutional contexts that are reflected in the performance of various functions. This section reports findings for the 16 agencies as a whole under six themes:

1. Institutions
2. Results focus
3. Coordination and promotion
4. Monitoring and evaluation
5. Funding and capacity
6. Performance

It then provides the results of the RSLAs’ self-reporting of their own performance, the results of an analysis of the related eight systems/programs identified across countries, and responses to the six research questions.
Three institutional forms were identified: government departments (seven agencies), autonomous agencies (five agencies), and councils with a professional secretariat (four agencies). No agencies took the opportunity provided to define themselves in another way. All but one of the RSLAs were established by a specific law that references their road safety responsibility. Half of the RSLAs were created between 1991 and 2012, and a quarter between 2009 and 2012. Namibia’s National Road Safety Council is the oldest, having been established in 1972 (although not operational until 20 years later), and Morocco’s National Road Safety Agency (NARSA) is the youngest, having been established in 2018. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the year of establishment does not always correspond with when operations began in each country. Fifty percent of the RSLAs became operational between 2007 and 2012.

Figure 4.1: Establishment and Operational Year of Participant RSLAs

- The capacity of the RSLA to lead is regulated by the quality of its legal mandate, and many agency mandates require strengthening.
- The strength of the mandate typically improves with the establishment of autonomous agencies.
- It is positive to note proposals to strengthen the lead agency mandate in some countries where national strategies have identified this need.
While all but one of the agencies have a legal foundation, the capacity of an RSLA to lead is regulated by the quality of its legal mandate. Several RSLAs have strong legal mandates, backed by acts of Parliament, such as Nigeria’s Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), Kenya’s National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA), and Morocco’s NARSA. These are large autonomous agencies that each also hold major delivery responsibilities. In Uganda, the lead agency’s function within the Department of Transport Regulation and Safety is also fully described in a 2020 act.

However, many agency mandates require strengthening. An assessment of the legal mandates applying overall and across the seven institutional road safety management functions is provided in Appendix C. The strength of the mandate typically improves with the establishment of autonomous agencies, but the recent strengthening of Ghana’s National Road Safety Authority (NRSA)—previously the National Road Safety Commission—reflects the value of continuing to strengthen the legal mandate. It is positive to note firm proposals to strengthen the lead agency mandate in Cameroon, which is another of the government departments, as well as in Namibia and in Mali, where national strategies had identified this need.

Ten agencies reported having a road safety policy document to guide them. Figure 4.2 reveals that none of the councils had such a guiding document, highlighting a weakness in the council form. A well-mandated agency is likely to have been provided a direct responsibility to establish the basis on which the country’s road safety effort will be undertaken.

There is a national interagency body in three-quarters of the countries covered by the study, and sometimes multiple bodies (Morocco, for example, has a formal governance system that extends well into local government and into technical areas). More than 60 percent of the interagency bodies were established under law and 80 percent have a terms of reference.

**Figure 4.2: Legal Establishment and Existence of a Guiding Document**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The institutional form of the RSLA</th>
<th>Is the RSLA established under a specific law?</th>
<th>Is there a road safety policy document that guides the RSLA operations?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A stand-alone autonomous agency</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="33%" /> YES 60% NO</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="20%" /> YES 7% NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A government department</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="47%" /> YES 53% NO</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="27%" /> YES 73% NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A council with a professional secretariat</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="13%" /> YES 87% NO</td>
<td><img src="image" alt="7%" /> YES 93% NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As might be expected, the internal organization of agencies was highly variable, given their scope and size. There were on average four work groups in each agency. Figure 4.3 illustrates the various functions of those work groups as described by the RSLAs. The prominence given to education activity and to general government affairs is notable.
Usually, the departments’ primary focus is on road safety education, road safety sensitization, and general affairs. Road safety data, driver training, and driving school regulations are the second most prevalent functions. Notably, the departments of some RSLAs (such as Morocco and Kenya) display a dense level of road safety management activities, including, in addition to the above, road safety strategies, coordination, and evaluation. The prominence given to motor vehicle and driver regulation activity (vehicle registration, inspection, driver licensing, and so on) reflects a general pattern of motor vehicle regulators being assigned road safety responsibilities.

**Figure 4.3: Main Activities of RSLA Work Groups**

![Figure 4.3: Main Activities of RSLA Work Groups](image)
4.2. Results Focus

Key Points

- Country strategies are well aligned with global and continental frameworks, but the delivery of road safety activities in line with safe system targets is unsatisfactory.
- There is a mismatch between the theoretical ambition of road safety set at a national level and the actual implementation of road safety activities.
- Not all stakeholders use respective strategies to achieve road safety objectives and goals, particularly those outside government.
- Most RSLAs undertake regular reviews of legislation, but the results often do not comply with international road safety guidelines and good practices.

The RSLAs are responsible for leading the national efforts to achieve the national road safety goals. In doing so, each needs to collaborate with stakeholders to establish a national road safety strategy and planning process that:

- Recognizes primary road safety issues at a national level;
- Sets an ambitious national vision and set of targets;
- Sets strategic directions and identifies primary interventions to realize that vision and achieve those targets; and
- Details implementation arrangements relating to governance, planning, delivery, and evaluation.

National road safety strategies and plans provide the mechanism for national, regional, and local stakeholders to agree on a roadmap for action to reduce fatal and serious injuries—on what will be done, by whom, and how. Almost all of the surveyed countries (93.33 percent) have a national road safety strategy or action plan in place (Figure 4.4).

Overwhelmingly, as illustrated in Figure 4.5, the RSLAs report that these strategies or action plans align with the UN Sustainable Development Goals, the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011–2020, and the African Road Safety Action Plan. Only a small minority consider that their strategy is not in line with these global and continental frameworks, which is important regardless of the overall road safety capacity of these countries to implement them.

Table 4.1 reports on the existence and nature of national road safety strategies and plans in the studied countries. The national road safety strategy is typically supported by an internal RSLA strategy or action plan reflecting the road safety vision and targets. In the best cases, the RSLA’s strategic plan and/or business plan has been developed by an internal team and/or supported by local consultants (60 percent).

Despite the existence of these strategic documents for road safety, the lack of stable and sufficient funding is a real obstacle to the delivery, implementation, and evaluation of road safety interventions. Although strategies and action plans are mostly in line with global orientations, implementation of road safety activities in line with the “Safe System” approach and targets is unsatisfactory. A mismatch between the theoretical ambitions of road safety set at the national level and the actual production of road safety outputs (implementation) in line with the required trends is observed.
Figure 4.6 illustrates that most surveyed countries only include deaths (14) and some countries include serious injuries (8) in their final safety outcomes. Apart from the target for deaths, it is rare to observe other final safety outcomes that are well defined and in line with global guidelines: 20 percent for hospitalizations and 33 percent for economic cost of crashes. Safety performance outcomes related to intermediate indicators (for interventions) and risk factors do not exist in most of the studied cases. The literature review revealed that hardly any impact evaluations (before and after studies) to understand the effectiveness of road safety interventions are done in Africa.

Strategies and targets are good tools of management that assist organizations to achieve desired goals. National road safety strategies are directly linked to governance and leadership by the lead agency that carries the vision, strategy, targets, action plans, and monitoring of implementation. An examination of the countries covered in this report shows that they are at different levels in respect to development of current road safety strategies and targets. They range from having national strategies and plans that are being implemented, albeit it with challenges, to not having a strategy and to developing strategies for the next decade. This dynamic, that is largely internal to MDA, partly explains why some stakeholders were ignorant of government road safety activities, with many assuming that road safety strategies are for internal use by MDA in charge of transport.

Most MDA have annual targets and plans that are directly linked to the respective country strategy and are also in line with their sector performance targets. Inclusion of road safety in the goals and objectives of MDA is mainstreaming the road safety agenda. However, outside MDA, not all stakeholders use respective strategies to achieve road safety objectives and goals. Some stakeholders noted that RSLAs are not doing well in reducing road crashes, largely because of unrealistic targets, inadequate funding and technical staff, and poor enforcement of regulations. In some cases, the action plans and the strategic targets are not aligned; in other cases, metropolitan, municipal, and regional governments are not actively involved in road safety. These shortcomings undermine the achievement of targets and the RSLAs’ performance. Key stakeholders need to be involved right at the conceptualization stage to generate buy-in, and to improve engagement with stakeholders over
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of compliance items</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Without answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The NRSS has a vision</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The NRSS has set specific targets</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets relate to deaths or injuries</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets relate to infrastructure, vehicle, user safety or post-crash</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targets relate to delivery of road safety programs</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding for the NRSS is approved by government</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the NRSS is evaluated</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RSLA has its own organizational strategy or activity plan</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RSLA strategy or plan refers to the NRSS</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RSLA strategy or plan refers to a vision or RS targets</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RSLA strategy or plan refers to the need for coordination with stakeholders</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The RSLA produces an annual activity report</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** NRSS = National Road Safety Strategy; RS = Road Safety; RSLA = Road Safety Lead Agency

### Figure 4.6: Final Safety Outcomes

**Deaths:**
- 50% reduction: 1 country
- ≤ 30% reduction: 5 countries
- 10 deaths per 10,000 vehicles: 4 countries

**Injuries:**
- 50% reduction: 3 countries
- ≤ 30% reduction: 3 countries
time, in particular with civil society organizations. In Namibia, stakeholders articulated a widely held view in the focus group discussions by emphasizing the need for all stakeholders to be responsible, stop pointing fingers, act as one, and ensure active involvement and coordination of activities and actors.

All strategies are aimed at reversing the trend and reducing the number of deaths and serious injuries in line with the UN Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2011–2020, achieving the goals of African Road Safety Charter, and the 2030 SDGs. There is also dedicated focus on care of the injured from scene of crash to hospital.

Overall, the majority of the RSLAs have a strategy or action plan. The strategies are aligned with UN Decade of Action, African Union framework, and SDGs. However, a lack of data compromises a proper situation analysis, while the implementation of strategies and plans is compromised by inadequate resources and weak engagement with stakeholders. The RSLAs need to work together with their partners and stakeholders to revise, update, and approve targeted laws and regulations related to road user behavior, driver licensing (testing/issue/regulation), vehicle safety, and infrastructure safety with adequate sustainable funding and sufficient technical and support staff.

**Legislation**

Legislative reform is a key means of implementing strategy. The RSLAs need to work with stakeholders to revise, update, and approve targeted laws and regulations related to road user behaviors (for example, speeding, drink driving, use of helmets/seatbelts/mobile phones), driver licensing (testing/issue/regulation), vehicle safety (for example, safety regulations for importing or constructing vehicles, or for vehicle roadworthiness/registration) and infrastructure safety (for example, requirements for road agency to provide safe roads, or undertake road safety inspections and audits).

Figure 4.7 illustrates that more than 80 percent of RSLAs have revised legislation related to road safety. However, these revisions often do not comply with international guidelines and good practices aimed at accelerating the maturity of road safety laws and regulations. The highest number of revisions relate to road user behaviors, but the revisions are infrequent and do not keep pace with the rapid development of road safety science. The legislative revisions in Africa are not following the trends required, and this has a direct impact on preparing projects in line with international road safety guidance and good practice.

**Figure 4.7: Periodic Legislation Reviews**

![Periodic Legislation Reviews](image-url)
During 2017, ANASER, Mali’s national road safety agency, established an interdepartmental working group to conduct a high-level review of road safety performance and prepare a national road safety strategy, assisted by an international expert team funded by the Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF). The team reviewed road safety performance and analyzed available statistical data. High-level workshops were conducted to discuss the most important road casualty problems and solutions throughout the road traffic system on the basis of data, surveys, and research, including the need to strengthen ANASER’s leadership mandate and capacity.

The strategy was finalized in December 2017 and adopted by the Council of Ministers in January 2021, by a decree approving the National Road Safety Strategy 2021–2030 and the first of two action plans (2021–2025). The strategy has three key elements:

- It covers a strategic period of time, 2021–2030, which aligns with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
- Using 2017 as the basis, a target was set to reduce fatalities by 50 percent by 2030, with an intermediate goal of reducing fatalities by 25 percent by 2025.

The strategy identifies several key strategic issues (areas of intervention):

- Safety of motorized two and three wheelers
- Pedestrian safety
- Professional transport safety
- Private vehicle safety
- Safety of road users aged 15 to 34

Based on the strategic issues, personalized and adapted intervention measures were proposed in the form of a complete matrix associating each strategic issue with six road safety pillars—road safety management, safer roads and mobility, safer speed, safer vehicles, road user behavior, and post-crash response. To allow proper monitoring and evaluation over the course of the strategy, the strategy contains a results framework that associates the strategy's objectives with final result indicators, intermediate indicators, and performance indicators.
4.3. Coordination and Promotion

Key Points

- Insufficient attention is given to interagency governance structures that bring different arms of government together and support engagement of stakeholders outside government.
- MDA are more likely to be engaged by RSLAs in coordinating road safety activity, and stakeholders outside government are much less likely to be engaged by RSLAs.
- Coordination is skewed toward the needs of RSLAs rather than toward a continual systematic coordination anchored in road safety strategy and planning.
- Not all RSLAs have been able to exploit the powerful ministries within which they are located to strengthen governance, coordination, and promotion activity.

Road safety is a complex field with many sectors and actors, both public and private, having direct responsibilities for and interests in the prevention of road traffic injury. Road traffic injuries are themselves the result of complex interactions between several interdependent factors related to humans (motor vehicle drivers and other road users), the environment (road design and management, weather and light conditions), and vehicles (technical quality and protection). These layers of complexity require efficient coordination and engagement of stakeholders, promoting all aspects of road traffic injury prevention, such as user safety, infrastructure safety, vehicle safety, post-crash response, traffic rules and enforcement, education and promotion, and data collection, analysis and sharing.

An important starting point is a governance mechanism that brings together different arms of government. Three-quarters of the responses reported the existence of an interagency body, and nearly two-thirds of these were established under law (Figure 4.8). Of the lead agencies with the strongest legal mandates, only Nigeria and Morocco have interagency governance bodies in place. These agencies are large, deliver multiple services, and are potentially very influential, but they are not omnipotent. The governance bodies they work to and with—in Nigeria, the National Road Safety Advisory Council chaired by the vice president, and in Morocco, the Interministerial Road Safety Committee chaired by the prime minister—provide important means of amplifying road safety imperatives and generating commitment to road safety across government and society.

Figure 4.8: Existence and Legal Status of National Interagency Bodies

![Existence and Legal Status of National Interagency Bodies](image-url)
The RSLAs were asked to rate the effectiveness of the interagency body. Among the 11 countries that reported the existence of an interagency body, the average effectiveness rating assigned by the lead agency is 2.7 out of a possible 5. As illustrated in Figure 4.9, four lead agencies rated the effectiveness of these governance bodies poorly (either 1 or 2 out of 5), and only two rated the body positively, at 4 out of 5.

RSLAs need to coordinate and align road safety interventions and management functions to support achievement of national targets. RSLAs cannot succeed on their own; they have to work with all stakeholders to leverage their different strengths and capacities for successful implementation of strategies and plans. Figure 4.10 indicates that 4 out of 5 have a legal mandate to coordinate all government and nongovernment stakeholders in order to achieve road safety goals. There is an agreed work program among stakeholders in most countries, and, in almost all countries, other government agencies include road safety objectives in their strategies and plans.

The RSLAs were asked to rate the effectiveness of their coordination with different groups of stakeholders, and the results are illustrated in Figure 4.11.

**Figure 4.9: RSLA Rating of Interagency Bodies**

**Figure 4.10: Coordination Mandate and Status**
The average rating the RSLAs gave themselves in effectiveness of coordination was 3.2 out of 5. The highest ratings were for the effectiveness of their coordination with the ministry of transport and with traffic police—this reflects the primary responsibility of road safety within the transport sector, and the traditional perspective of the problem as one of compliance. The lowest ratings were for their coordination with local governments, communities, and private sector organizations, which is of concern as these groups directly interact with issues of road safety, including crash, injury, and fatality scenes.

4.3.1 | Stakeholder Engagement
These results were largely validated in discussions with stakeholders across countries—there is more coordination activity, and more effective coordination activity, between the RSLA and the MDA, with whom they share similar points of reference in their bureaucratic structures and culture of work. This is different from stakeholders outside government in academia, business, and community entities, who do not feel they are actively connected with the national road safety effort by the RSLA. From the perspectives of road safety...
safety stakeholders, coordination is largely taking place between MDA, better than that between other stakeholders, but the findings nevertheless reveal challenges within the MDA.

The MDA in Africa are the driving force behind road safety policies, strategies, and plans, but their internal coordination is weak. In some cases, they have overlapping responsibilities without clear coordination mechanisms. In cases where mechanisms exist, implementation is generally poor. Stakeholders attribute coordination weaknesses to several factors:

1. Lack of authority over the other agencies
2. Nonbinding decisions of agencies
3. Actions being limited to recommendations and advisory
4. Lack of data to inform decisions
5. Lack of technical expertise
6. Financial constraints

Stakeholders have reported MDA contributing to road safety goals in isolation from each other and a need for efficient interagency coordination. Examples provided include South Africa and Tunisia, where issues were raised about the mandate, and Uganda, where there is no interagency coordination mechanism at all. The National Road Safety Committee in Egypt was considered moribund, and in Cameroon coordination is through the National Road Council, with stakeholders reporting that the National Road Safety Committee is weak and hardly meets.

Each country faces different governance and coordination challenges, but one confounder is where the national constitution embeds a strong federal system. This presents significant challenges not only for a small professional secretariat such as in Ethiopia but also for a large entity such as Nigeria’s FRSC, where there is significant operational staffing in all 36 states, but not all states have established the necessary institutions to engage with the national leadership on the issue. Similar federal issues are reported in Kenya and South Africa. In one country, the national road safety lead agency was actually viewed as a competitor by subnational jurisdictions due to the allocation of responsibilities, and revenue, associated with motor vehicle revenue.

Coordination and engagement with civil society organizations and the private sector varies across countries, ranging between weak and good. Good coordination was generally reported in Ghana, Mali, and Namibia. In Namibia, for example, the National Road Safety Council secretariat engages stakeholders in activities and communication through email and WhatsApp and facilitates an annual road safety conference and workshop, which keep stakeholders informed of activities. However, gaps were reported in their support for stakeholders’ road safety activities and attendance at stakeholder meetings and activities.

Across all countries, stakeholders uniformly expressed an interest in being involved in RSLA activities and for RSLA involvement in their activities. However, stakeholders do not generally consider the national road safety strategy when planning their strategies, even though they are contributing to the general goal. It was noted that the weak coordination makes it difficult for stakeholders to contribute to road safety goals. A common call among stakeholders was for formal engagement as decisions are made, resources are allocated, performance is monitored, and strategies are reviewed. This was irrespective of the institutional form of the RSLA.

Any governance, coordination, or wider engagement barriers that exist will inevitably affect the extent to which the RSLA performs its function of promoting road safety within society. The agency is expected to ensure that knowledge on road safety, including policies, laws, regulations, strategies, plans, and targets, are well known to the public and to all stakeholders. Furthermore, the RSLA is expected to coordinate all the promotional activities geared toward achievement of road safety goals. Although promotion is taking place across the 16 countries covered in the study, the activities are largely conducted in an incoherent manner. Stakeholder reports of cooperation and coordination on promotional activities by the RSLA are the exception.

Some information about key safety behaviors by users is likely to remain important, but the scale of the road safety challenge across Africa requires a much more strategic promotional approach. All stakeholders need to be sufficiently informed to advocate for major reform, such as increased investment, safer road environments, or better regulation and enforcement. The road safety promotional activities mainly cover education and awareness creation, which include development and production of educational materials, educating the public, advocacy, and sensitization activities.
in workshops and open forums. These activities are accompanied by the production of campaign material—such as T-shirts, hats, brochures, and booklets—targeting certain categories of road users (in particular children), nonusage of phones by drivers, and speeding.

Most countries have no coordinated approach to promotion of road safety, which creates a risk of the promotion function lapsing into simply telling users how to behave rather than taking a more strategic approach. A coordinated approach would leverage available road safety resources across stakeholders for targeted and prioritized promotional activities. Civil society organizations are important in this area because some of them have cooperation with international nongovernmental organizations and other development partners, especially in the areas of training and advocacy.

Poor coordination of promotional activities is related to poor coordination of road safety stakeholders, and poor governance of road safety at a national multisectoral level. The development of a mechanism for coordinating road safety stakeholders would highly benefit promotional activities. Such a mechanism could have a subgroup or committee facilitated by the RSLA to coordinate the many promotional activities taking place across Africa in respective countries. Ineffective M&E also affects promotional activities because it limits the dissemination of data and status of road safety goals that enable targeted promotional activities, as opposed to generalized promotions unconnected to a reform program.
The quality of the legal mandate for an RLSA depends in part on the interagency governance and wider coordination mechanisms that facilitate the orchestration and alignment of interventions and institutional management functions delivered by government partners and related community and business partnerships to achieve the desired focus on results. Morocco's governance and coordination systems were established in 2006 and updated in 2020 when the National Road Safety Agency (NARSA) was operationalized. There are three key dimensions:

- Horizontal governance and coordination across central government
- Vertical integration from central to regional and local levels of government
- Delivery partnerships between government, nongovernment, and business at the central, regional, and local levels

There are three main management levels:

- The Interministerial Road Safety Committee, chaired by the prime minister and made up of all ministers concerned by the road safety issue
- The Permanent Road Safety Committee, chaired by the minister of transport and logistics and made up of representatives of the Interministerial Road Safety Committee, which is responsible for preparing national strategies and action plans, and coordinating and monitoring implementation
- The Regional Road Safety Committees, chaired by the regional governor and made up of local road safety stakeholders

These arrangements provide a decision-making hierarchy and partnership framework for achieving road safety goals through developing, implementing, and monitoring national road safety strategies, plans, and performance targets that have been agreed across government.

A similar arrangement is in place in Nigeria where, with the support of the Federal Road Safety Corps, the vice president chairs the National Road Safety Advisory Council, which approves the road safety strategy; the minister of transport chairs the technical working group; and some states also have established statewide structures.
4.4. Monitoring and Evaluation

Key Points

- Monitoring, evaluation, and learning are critical to road safety but are not prioritized by RSLAs:
  - Safety performance indicators (for interventions) and risk factors do not exist in most countries, and few countries monitor and evaluate them.
  - There are hardly any impact evaluations (before and after studies) to understand the effectiveness of road safety interventions.
  - Most countries do not have centralized crash data and clear definitions on issues such as injury status and black spots.
- Poor data systems result in underreporting of fatalities, and in isolated cases where data are reliable, there is minimal effort for deeper analysis to obtain insights on road safety.
- Data are the domain of the police, the ministries of health and transport, citizen registries, and judiciary and insurance firms, but oversight and coordination by RSLA is vital.

Data gathering and information sharing are useful for monitoring, evaluation, and stakeholder engagement. However, most countries are weak in data gathering, analysis, storage, and sharing. Few countries undertake monitoring and evaluation of key performance indicators and related targets for performance management purposes. These inefficiencies affect the performance of RSLAs and stakeholders. It is not possible to efficiently involve stakeholders and improve road safety performance without data and information. Road safety data:

- Highlight the extent of road safety problems;
- Inform the development of road safety policies, strategies, and action plans;
- Help monitor trends and drive future road safety improvement;
- Help identify high-risk road user groups, location and risk factors influencing road traffic crashes; and
- Provide knowledge for road safety education and enforcement of organizations, as well as the overall evaluation of effectiveness of road safety targets.

Data are actually largely the domain of other government agencies responsible for different functions, such as police, ministries of health and related facilities, transport, citizen registry, and judiciary and insurance firms. Some of these agencies take responsibility for monitoring specific indicators to feed into road safety. RSLAs do not need to be directly in charge of road safety data collection and management, but they do need to ensure that the systems are in place to allow effective monitoring and evaluation for road safety in respective countries. Good governance and operational arrangements are needed for road safety data systems to be effective and valuable for all relevant MDA and other stakeholders.

Figure 4.12 reveals that the basic variables of road crashes, such as fatalities and injuries, are widely collected and shared by the RSLAs and their partners; however, road crash data related to intermediate indicators and risk factors such as child restraint, motorcycle helmet use, and drink driving are largely not collected.
Figure 4.12: Type of Data Gathered and Shared across Agencies

- Road crash deaths: Collected. Is data shared?
- Road crash injuries: Collected. Is data shared?
- Hospitalized road crash victims: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with speed limit: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with seat belt law: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with vehicle inspection: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with driver training, testing and licensing: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with mobile phone law: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with drink driving law: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with motorcycle helmet law: Collected. Is data shared?
- Compliance with child restraint law: Collected. Is data shared?
- Other: Collected. Is data shared?
The RSLAs and stakeholders do not consider that death and injury reporting is accurate (Figure 4.13). Almost all countries (86.7 percent) define road traffic death as having occurred within 30 days of the road crash, in line with the WHO definition, but this is not reflected in data provided by the RSLAs.

Most countries (80 percent) are considering having a centralized police and hospital data system coordinated by the RSLA, although road safety agencies have a limited role in defining the types of data to be collected. Their role (90 percent) is concentrated in regularly analyzing data in order to improve strategies and interventions.

Some countries only collect fatality data at the scene of a crash, and others have no limit concerning the duration after which a fatality occurred. A result of these poor data systems is that countries are typically underreporting fatalities.

Reported data generated by countries is different to the estimates often used by multilateral agencies such as WHO, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank. Table 4.2: Ratio of WHO Estimated Fatalities to Reported Fatalities, 2010–16 provides a ratio of WHO’s estimated fatalities to each country’s reported fatalities. Ideally, the ratio is 1:1, as it is in South Africa, with Namibia and Egypt also showing a close match. WHO’s use of multiple data sources to provide a consistent estimate, while countries use a single source, could explain the difference. Thus, data remain a concern that is being addressed by countries, and the establishment of the Africa Road Safety Observatory is particularly positive in this regard.

Most agencies are not directly in charge of collecting crash data, but they are responsible for data sharing and communication of national figures. Some agencies work closely with police to collect data, but the data are not complete. Efficient data collection includes following post-crash victims until the 30th day after the accident, which most RSLAs are not efficiently coordinating.

The RSLAs are generally weak at coordinating the gathering of reliable data to inform national and regional road safety plans. Data are drawn from several sources, including police, hospitals, insurance companies, birth and death registries, accidents and investigators, with police being the dominant source. However, in most cases there is minimal link between police and hospitals that receive crash victims. Few countries ensure crash data collection from the time a crash is recorded with formalized procedures for daily data entry, follow-up sheets, and prioritized statistics that are communicated to relevant MDA and other stakeholders.

Access to data is a major challenge even where data are available. Some agencies have agreements with the MDA that collect data (in particular police) to access data on a regular basis. However, some country regions and local authorities do not have access to their own data apart from aggregated

Figure 4.13: Accuracy, Production of Reports, and Deaths within 30 Days

Accuracy of reported deaths and injuries

- 40% YES
- 60% NO
- Not Available

Production of periodic road crash report

- 80% YES
- 20% NO
- Not Available

Compliance of death within 30 days

- 86.7% YES
- 13.3% NO
- Not Available
tables that are not adequate for targeted interventions. Making data available would allow for crowdsourcing of analysis and provision of credible, valuable, and additional insights on road safety problems. Stakeholders argued that inadequate data make it difficult to draw conclusions about the scale of road safety problems. Some stakeholders called for the development of national crash databases, a linkage between police and hospitals, and the development of standardized smartphone mobile applications to enable recording of crash data, including global positioning system location. Such data should be relayed to a centralized and automated data system.

Table 4.2: Ratio of WHO Estimated Fatalities to Reported Fatalities, 2010-16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, DR</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>-1</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.14: Conduct and Funding of Evaluations shows signs of periodic evaluations of road safety interventions, although a third of the countries do not undertake periodic evaluations. The majority of evaluations are conducted by internal staff and paid by the RSLA, which is commendable. However, in spite of the evaluations, most countries do not have centralized national crash data, nor clarity on definitions such as injury status and black spots.

Research and academic institutions seem to have access to data, with some providing useful data for road safety interventions. Some of these institutions access raw data for detailed analysis.
This is a step in the right direction that should be extended to other stakeholders for use and response to road safety targets. For example, the Building and Road Research Institute (BRRI) in Ghana has data analysis software. The agency gets data from police, hospitals, insurance companies, birth and death registries, accidents, and investigators. In Uganda, the Makerere University School of Public Health collects its own data from various sources, then analyzes and converts it to fit their purposes. The school has a database on road traffic injury; however, it is not updated, and there is a need for the RSLA to harmonize the data and exploit stakeholders’ capacities in data generation and analysis, with the agency as the repository of data. Universities in South Africa and Namibia also had better access to data compared with other stakeholders.

In 2018, a conceptualization of an integrated system of collection of data, analysis, and dissemination on road safety funded by the World Bank was completed in Cameroon. The system pulls data from the national police, the National Gendamarie, hospitals, the Ministry of Transport, the National Institute of Statistics, and insurance companies. The data are centralized in an independent entity at the National Advanced School of Public Works, which releases data after validation by the Ministry of Transport and National Institute of Statistics.

Overall, the RSLA responses suggest the RSLAs do not prioritize monitoring, evaluation, and learning—which should be the core of road safety. There are some ongoing initiatives of computerization and centralization of road safety data, in particular road traffic injury, but few countries are advanced in embracing computerized and centralized road safety data systems. There are deficits in data relevant for ensuring road safety, which could explain the high injury and death rates in Africa. Most countries have intermediate safety performance indicators focusing on driving that exceeds the speed limit, the percentage of drivers with illegal blood alcohol levels, and seat belt and motorcycle helmet wearing rates, but these outcomes are not efficiently monitored using data. In the absence of reliable data on location, frequency, severity, and types of crashes, determining why crashes occur and how they are best prevented can never be complete. Data shortcomings undermine RSLA performance.

**Figure 4.14: Conduct and Funding of Evaluations**

Note: DP = Development Partner; IS = Internal Staff; LC = Local Consultant; RSLA = Road Safety Lead Agency
4.5. Funding and Capacity

Key Points

- The lack of stable and sufficient funding is a real obstacle to implementation and evaluation of road safety interventions, and five of the 16 RSLAs had no funding for their road safety approved strategic plan.
- Insufficient use is made of sustainable domestic funding sources, such as fuel levies or insurance premiums.
- Half of the RSLAs reported they had 50–75 percent of the required resources to deliver on their mandate, and more than 40 percent had less than half of the required resources.
- The RSLAs operate at below average financial and human resources, and cannot fulfill their mandated functions, including hiring adequate and skilled personnel to undertake the road safety functions.

There is a significant funding and human resources deficit in Africa’s road safety ecosystem. This undermines the effective performance of the RSLAs. All the agencies irrespective of their legislative mandate, political support, stakeholder engagement, strategy development, coordination efforts, and data systems face this challenge. The stakeholders both inside and outside government also need financial and human resources. Both sets of resources need to be considered in terms of what the RSLA needs to perform its functions, and what their stakeholders need to perform their functions. The findings reveal that RSLAs operate at below average financial and human resources and that they cannot effectively fulfill their mandated functions, including hiring adequate personnel to undertake the road safety functions. Development partners and civil society organizations provide some technical support and funding, in particular in the areas of data management, development of policies, strategies, and creation of road safety awareness.

Sustained funding sources are necessary for the RSLA, and the RSLA needs to be engaged in decision-making regarding the allocation of available safety funds. This decision-making involves setting safety budgets, setting revenue streams to fund those budgets, and ensuring that budgets are allocated to activities that will generate the greatest returns. An effective strategy should be supported by a funded multiagency action plan to implement the road safety strategy, focused on evidence-based interventions.

An examination of the RSLAs’ main revenue sources reveal that the national budget and the national treasury are the basic revenue sources for 73 percent of the agencies (Figure 4.15). In addition, the national road fund and the responsible ministry are noted to be institutional sources of funding for 60 percent of the surveyed countries. Very little use is made of fuel levies or insurance levies, although these may already be incorporated into road fund revenues.

In most countries, ministerial departments fund projects that are part of the implementation of road safety sector strategies and are included in actual plans and budgets of respective departments. Observations of stakeholders included the need for RSLAs to have a multiyear investment organization designed to mobilize civil society organizations and international donors in support of road safety strategies. Long-term funding was considered necessary to execute strategies, with specific concern expressed for effective crash investigation, prosecution, and victim support; the deployment of enforcement officers; and digital options for efficient services.

Despite its insufficient financial contribution, the public sector remains the leading financier of road safety in Africa, followed by the private sector and multilateral development banks (Figure 4.16).
Figure 4.15: Main Revenue and Funding Sources for RSLA Budget

Figure 4.16: Main Road Safety Funders
A comparison of the annual budget allocated to each RSLA reveals huge contrasts, reflecting the widely differing operational mandates and populations (Table 4.3). The budgets range from a few thousand dollars (Egypt, for instance, with US$7,500) to hundreds of millions of dollars (Morocco and Nigeria). Six agencies reported budgets of less than US$1 million per year for 2020/21. Five RSLAs also reported no funding for their approved national road safety strategy or action plan.

The study did not investigate how the public sector budget is allocated, but in the literature, budget prioritizes payment of existing human resource and administrative costs. This leaves gaps in activities geared toward road safety action plans.

The study revealed that 93.3 percent of the agencies consider that their budget is not sufficient to deliver mandated functions. Figure 4.17 illustrates that half of the RSLAs had 50–75 percent of the required resources to deliver on their mandate, and more than 40 percent had less than half of the required resources.

Stakeholders provided examples where budget deficits were very high—for example, a 300 million budget being reduced to 73 million in local currency. Taking into account the mandates of these agencies, their current budget, and their achievements in past years, the RSLAs have difficulty estimating their real financial need or to understand the road safety missions to be delivered. The capacity of these African agencies is weak and needs rapid strengthening. Stakeholders consider the agencies have not effectively exploited opportunities that could support organizations with minimal funds. Examples include using universities to host road safety organizations and involving faculties to address issues highlighted in the Decade of Action for Road Safety 2021–2030. Some universities and knowledge generation organizations are already contributing to road safety outcomes on their own initiative.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2018/19</th>
<th>2019/20</th>
<th>2020/21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>297,500</td>
<td>360,400</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>320,400</td>
<td>338,200</td>
<td>267,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2,853,609</td>
<td>2,985,115</td>
<td>3,860,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>180,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>8,571,429</td>
<td>9,071,429</td>
<td>125,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>4,686,252</td>
<td>3,865,984</td>
<td>4,996,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>85,175,694</td>
<td>97,233,933</td>
<td>103,346,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>809,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>810,000</td>
<td>820,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Amount Allocated to RSLAs, US$
Figure 4.17: Satisfaction of Funding and Proportion of Required Resources

Figure 4.18: Total RSLA Technical Staff
Road safety agencies in Africa lack sufficient and stable financial resources to carry out their mission. One of the important observations is that where the budget is lacking, human resources are also lacking. For example, the NTSA in Kenya, made up of three departments, employs 470 staff, while the NARSA in Morocco, made up of six departments, employs 205 staff (Figure 4.18). Nigeria is an exception, with a very high number of staff—60,794. With the exception of Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, and South Africa, the RSLAs reported that they do not employ the necessary and approved number of technical and support staff.

The deficit in technical and support staff is partially filled by development partners who support building of national capacity and technical skills in road safety initiatives, policy reviews, data management, and in isolated cases project proposal writing and organization management.

Figure 4.19 illustrates that the RLSAs’ highest funding priorities are funding and investment bids; road safety advocacy and information; review of laws, policies and standards; post-crash response; and personnel and capacity building. Although data collection, analysis, and sharing are lacking in Africa, this was the lowest funding priority for the RSLAs.

**Figure 4.19: RSLA Rating of Funding Priorities**

Note: Scores represent the average rating on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 the lowest and 10 the highest.
Funding and resource allocation concerns the financing of interventions and related institutional management functions on a sustainable basis using a rational evaluation and programming framework to allocate resources to achieve the desired focus on results.

In Ghana, as part of a reform of the National Road Safety Authority Act 2019, the lead agency mandate, previous generic referencing to funds for road safety was made much more explicit and expanded to include regulatory fees.

The act provides that the funds of the National Road Safety Authority (NRSA) include the following:
- 2.5% of revenue accruing to the Ghana Road Fund
- 2% of revenue accruing to the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority from vehicle and driver testing services
- A percentage of revenue accruing to the National Insurance Commission for motor insurance, to be reviewed annually by the commission, the NRSA, and the Ghana Insurance Association

By establishing a percentage of revenues from these sources, the authority’s legislated revenue streams will rise with increased activity and provide a much more sustainable funding mechanism over time.

There has been a significant rise in the NRSA budget from fiscal year 2018/19 to 2020/21—through an 85 percent increase in funds allocated from the Ghana Road Fund (to US$3.76 million), and a nearly 50 percent increase in total budget to US$5.06 million. Additional funding comes with additional responsibility, and more importantly opportunity to strengthen the safety response by NRSA and its stakeholders.

While the NRSA budget is still considered to be sufficient to cover only 50–75 percent of the required resources to deliver on its mandated functions, it appears that there has been a considerable strengthening in the financial resources of the agency.

In Morocco, the National Road Safety Agency has a large set of functions, and a much bigger budget—US$200 million (2021)—which is drawn from a wide range of sources:
- Central government budget allocation
- Regulatory vehicle (for example, registration) and driver charges (for example, driver license issue)
- Contributions from the fuel levy, and from compulsory insurance premiums
- Contributions from automotive, fuel distribution, and insurance companies
- Fixed speed camera fines (cameras are operated by the road safety agency)

It is important that countries establish sustainable funding for the lead agency’s road safety efforts and that the lead agency is involved in the funding and allocation processes for safety budgets across government. Kenya’s National Transport and Safety Authority Act provides a legislative basis for this wider funding and resource allocation role, establishing that a safety levy can be applied to motor vehicle regulatory activity and compulsory insurance policies, and paid into a fund to implement road safety strategies. However, this has not yet been operationalized.

Tunisia has a national road safety fund (Fonds de Prévention des Accidents de la Circulation) managed by the Ministry of Interior. Insurance levies form the core revenue source for the fund, which is limited to financing awareness-raising organizations and campaigns, training, studies and research, and the acquisition and installation of certain equipment. An advisory committee for the fund includes representatives of the ministries responsible for transport and infrastructure and representatives of consumer protection and professional bodies.
4.6. Performance

Measuring and specifying the performance of road safety lead agencies is difficult. At a country level, the overall performance can be clearly measured in terms of deaths and serious injuries, and this must be the overall measure that the lead agency uses itself. However, assigning a statement of RSLA performance against those final safety outcomes does not reflect the myriad of factors that directly affect performance.

The RSLAs were invited to rate the factors that may constrain their performance. Nine constraining factors were identified and the RSLAs were asked to rate each factor on a scale of 1 (least problematic) to 5 (most problematic). None of the agencies took the opportunity provided to identify other constraining factors. They identified funding as the most problematic constraint affecting performance, with an average rating of 4.3 out of 5. Ineffective enforcement of regulations was the next most problematic constraint, followed by system constraints, lack of data, and lack of up-to-date legislation. Legal constraints was identified as the least problematic factor, although it still rated over 2.7 out of 5 (Figure 4.20).

Figure 4.20: RSLA Rating of Factors Affecting Performance

Note: Scores represent the average rating on a scale of 1 (least problematic) to 5 (most problematic).
The RSLAs were also invited to self-rate their overall performance in regard to 14 activities that need to be done to support sustained reductions in serious road trauma (see Figure 4.21). None of the agencies took the opportunity provided to identify other aspects of performance. The RSLAs rated their performance on a scale of 1 (least positive) to 5 (most positive).

The highest average rating of RSLA performance on this scale was close to 4 out of 5, given to four activities:
- Managing resource allocation of available road safety funding
- Promoting effective road safety activities by government and other stakeholders
- Promoting road safety within the community
- Compilation and dissemination of national road safety statistics

The lowest average rating of RSLA performance on this scale was just over 2.5 out of 5, given to two activities: coordinating road safety activities across different levels of government, and strategic road safety research and knowledge transfer.

A more precise statement of performance across the agencies may be to focus less on the rating of activities and more on the presence of programs and systems. Drawing from the institutional road safety management functions identified earlier in the...
report, eight more precise programs and systems were defined. The researchers assessed them on the basis of the questionnaire and the stakeholder focus group discussions, and placed them into low, medium, and high bands, as illustrated in Table 4.4. It is notable that the aspects which RSLAs rated themselves higher on were not always evident to the researchers in the data that were collected—road safety promotion among stakeholders and defined safety funding roles, for example. This perhaps relates to the way in which the safety tasks are defined—it is possible, for example, that the RSLAs are very effective in managing the internal resources they have control over, and that the lead agencies are not effectively engaged in lifting the safety funding available to the sector as a whole.

Table 4.4: Agency Strength across Programs and Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Program/System</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Agencies’ strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results focus</td>
<td>The existence of a modern national road safety policy, strategy, and/or action plan</td>
<td>Necessary for a lead agency to work toward defined goals, targets, and objectives</td>
<td>High—Most agencies can point to a national document they have prepared, some being better than others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>A road safety governance system with an interagency body and stakeholder engagement</td>
<td>Necessary for a lead agency to bring stakeholders together in a focused national effort</td>
<td>Medium—Only some agencies are able to draw upon support from interagency and stakeholder processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation</td>
<td>Recent and/or regular reviews of significant legislation and compliance issues</td>
<td>Necessary to ensure that Parliament/government is keeping pace with good practice</td>
<td>Medium—Some agencies are conducting regular reviews, but these tend to be the bigger agencies only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>A defined role in allocating safety resources across government and the community</td>
<td>Necessary to advocate for greater allocation of available resources to road safety goals</td>
<td>Low—While some agencies have internal funding systems, very few are engaged in wider safety funding mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>Regular promotion of road safety among key stakeholders and decision-makers</td>
<td>Necessary to ensure that stakeholders and decision-makers have road safety at the forefront</td>
<td>Low—While rated well by the RSLAs themselves, this is not supported by the data generated in this study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>A demonstrable focus on improving the quality of crash data</td>
<td>Necessary to continually improve data and improve safety decision-making and delivery</td>
<td>Low—Some but not all agencies actively recognize data issues and are seeking to directly tackle them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and development and knowledge transfer</td>
<td>A program of monitoring road safety performance factors and deliverables</td>
<td>Necessary to track progress across all aspects and stakeholders and hold them to account</td>
<td>Medium—Agencies are monitoring progress but not generally in a manner consistent with good practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regular research, development, and capacity-building projects</td>
<td>Necessary to continue to push past immediate horizons and build capacity for the future</td>
<td>Low—Only a few agencies have active research and capacity-building programs in place</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6.1 | Analysis

The research questions regarding road safety lead agency performance are challenging questions in any environment, and a systematic approach was taken to collect the best available data in Africa that would allow these questions to be answered for Africa.

1. **What are the organizational and performance characteristics of effective lead agencies?**

RSLAs operate in a complex environment with many institutions and actors, which have to be taken into consideration when analyzing their performance. Leaving aside challenges with identifying accurate reporting of fatalities and serious injuries, it is not useful to refer to fatalities and serious injuries as the basis of performance by which lead agencies in Africa can be assessed. There are simply too many variables, starting with the legal mandate and resourcing of the lead agency, and including a complex set of institutional arrangements across a diverse sector.

Fourteen activities were identified upon which the RSLAs rated themselves. A further eight practical program or system features were identified as the basis for researchers to assess the strength of the agencies. An assessment of the legal mandate for countries, which impacts on the ability of the RSLA to perform, highlighted that only four RSLAs (Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, and Nigeria) have strong mandates. This does not mean their performance is high, but it provides a much better basis on which to improve. It is notable that one of them, Ghana, has just emerged from a strengthening process, highlighting the need for continual work in this area.

2. **How do these characteristics manifest themselves in lead agencies in low- and middle-income (African) countries?**

Of the eight practical program or system features, only the presence of a national road safety strategy, policy, or action plan rated highly across the study countries. The lowest rating features, based on the data available to the researchers, related to promotion, funding, crash data, and research and capacity building. African countries are encouraged to undertake their own assessment against the results of this study and identify the key areas in which progress is required. They should consider the quality of their institutional response to road safety, and what can be done to improve this response.
3. Under what circumstances is one model of organization more appropriate than the other? This study does not allow us to conclude that one model of organization for RSLAs is more appropriate than another. Each country’s governmental structure and system has evolved in its own way, at different times, and in response to different factors. It is notable that two countries with the weakest institutional mandates—Egypt and the Democratic Republic of Congo—are simultaneously the safest and least safe of the study countries. It is more important to consider the current institutional settings for road safety in a country and to assess how those settings can be improved in that country than to define the best model. Some of the biggest lead agencies appear to have the strongest potential to achieve substantial results (for example, Morocco’s NARSA). However, a much smaller lead agency has significantly strengthened its institutional settings, and potential (Ghana).

4. To what extent does the mechanism by which they are set up and their capacity address their effectiveness for leading and coordinating road safety stakeholders and deliver their mandate of achieving national and SDG road safety targets?

A review of the establishment of each agency highlights the critical nature of its legal mandate, be they a government department, a stand-alone agency, or a coordinating committee. Without a clear mandate, lead agencies cannot effectively perform. The funding, resources, and systems must be put in place to deliver on that mandate.

Safety leadership in a disaggregated agency environment involving some of the most powerful agencies (for example, police) and the most resourced agencies (for example, highways) in government is not straightforward. Coordination can be difficult and time-consuming. To meet these challenges, it is clear that the lead agency must be outward looking at all times, constantly communicating with partners inside and outside of government to maximize the stakeholders’ delivery of safety services. RSLAs need to set themselves up to ensure their own internal structures place sufficient weight and importance on these outward-looking functions, and not just on those that are easily defined and controlled internally (for example, motor vehicle regulation).

5. How do these agencies work out the “good practice” with respect to governance, funding, and responsibilities to deliver their mandate?

There is some dependence on development partners for good practice, but there is not much transfer of good practice to stakeholders, which is problematic. Lead agencies are not routinely adopting good practice, but there are good examples. One important good practice is the evidence of sharing between countries, particularly in West Africa, where the professional links within the West African Road Safety Organisation continue to influence improvements across countries.

6. What strategic appropriate reform measures should be adopted to improve the effectiveness of lead agencies in low- and middle-income countries?

Six lessons have been identified from this study:

1. **Institutional mandate**: The safety mandate is important to establish at an early point, and it needs to be renewed. It must be continually nourished and never forgotten.

2. **Results focus**: Strategy development and implementation processes are a critical means of a lead agency bringing something to the table, establishing their credibility, and delivering improved safety.

3. **Coordination**: Establishing and maintaining stakeholder engagement processes is time-consuming and difficult but essential to the long-term value that the RSLA can deliver.

4. **Funding**: Sustainable funding sources for the RSLA and for the safety programs being delivered by other MDA need to be considered as a critical governance and institutional issue.

5. **Monitoring and evaluation**: Direct involvement in road safety data management is important for the RSLA to deliver its wider leadership role.

6. **Capacity building**: Capacity building is a critical and ongoing consideration as the RSLA is established, grows, and leads the national road safety effort.

These lessons are discussed further in section 5, and recommendations made.
This study was undertaken to learn from the current state of road safety lead agencies in Africa and to identify opportunities to strengthen the institutional response to the continent’s road safety crisis.

Each RSLA is encouraged to use the results of the study to reflect on its own situation and, in concert with national stakeholders and development partners, carefully consider the next best steps at a country level, particularly given the constraints each is likely to face:

- A poor economic environment in the region from which to support RSLA initiatives
- A constant struggle to generate and maintain political will and commitment to major safety reform
- Insufficient and unstable funding for RSLAs in the region
- Competition against other pressing social and environmental issues

Six lessons were drawn from this study, and recommendations made. The focus of the lessons and recommendations is on countries and RSLAs, and they are relevant for all their development partners as well. It is therefore also recommended that development partners do the following:

- Undertake a follow-up study of lead agencies in Africa in the middle of the Second Decade of Action for Road Safety 2021-2030.
- Initiate the preparation of a manual for RLSAs, drawing upon the findings of this study and providing direct support for RSLAs in Africa to lift their performance.
Lesson 1: Institutional Mandate

The safety mandate is important to establish at an early point, and it needs to be renewed. It must be continually nourished and never forgotten.

The task of leading road safety through a dedicated government entity is not a recent development in Africa. The study shows that RSLAs operate under different legal mandates and that there is a trend in Africa toward legally establishing a road safety agency with financial and organizational autonomy. Important institutional examples in this study are in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. They each face issues, but each is in a position to capitalize on safety opportunities.

It is important to recognize that performance cannot be separated from the overall mandate of the agency, the strength of that mandate in law, and the way in which that mandate is maintained over time. RSLA leadership can be effective in nourishing that mandate through their own attributes and engagement with stakeholders, but systemic and institutional responses are needed for a sustained response to the road traffic injury crisis in Africa. It is therefore encouraging to note the attention given to road safety governance and institutional issues in a number of the countries studied. Interagency bodies are being established, such as the National Road Safety Advisory Council in Nigeria; agencies or functions are being established, such as the Office of Road Safety in Chad and the National Road Safety Agency in Morocco; and existing institutions have been or are in the process of being strengthened, such as in Ghana and Mali.

The legal mandate for the institution should clearly outline the following:

- The lead agency’s responsibilities in relation to:
  - The institutional management functions described in this report; and
  - The safety responsibilities of other government institutions
- The interagency governance arrangements inside government for overseeing road safety strategy development, implementation, and review
- The accountability arrangements for funding, delivering, and evaluating road safety programs
- Expectations regarding engagement with stakeholders outside government in the pursuit of national road safety goals

Recommendation 1

It is recommended that countries review and, if necessary, enhance the legislative mandate of the lead agency, the wider interagency governance systems for road safety, and the engagement with stakeholders outside government in pursuit of national road safety goals.

It is also recommended that countries do the following:

R1.1: Review what aspects of their legal mandate can be strengthened and how that stronger mandate could be used to advance national road safety goals.

R1.2: Prepare and convene a stakeholder roundtable to discuss road safety mandate and governance arrangements, seeking support from international development partners to provide external perspective on this.

R1.3: Provide advice to government on the legal mandate and governance issues related to the achievement of national road safety goals, including specific strengthening proposals.

Participant countries in this study can refer to the summary assessment found in Appendix C of the relative strength of their existing mandates across the different road safety institutional management functions.
Lesson 2: Results Focus

Strategy development and implementation processes are critical means of a lead agency bringing something to the table, establishing their credibility and delivering improved safety.

Most RSLAs have a national road safety strategy or action plan that is inspired by and oriented to global targets and agreements such as the Sustainable Development Goals, the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety, and the African Road Safety Action Plan. However, the final results on deaths and serious injuries do not match the ambition, and four RSLAs are not working to a national strategy or action plan (Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda), which makes it more difficult to deliver on their road safety mandate.

The quality of strategy documents seems to depend on who initiated the project. Strategies prepared with foreign inputs generally appear stronger than ones developed solely with local inputs, but they may include measures unsuitable to the local context. Whatever the basis of the strategy, RSLAs need to ensure sustained investment in M&E activity in order to track progress at a national level. Without this, interventions to achieve fatality and serious injury targets will continue to be compromised. Many road safety-related laws and regulations are outdated, and compliance with existing safety standards is a major challenge intensified by a lack of monitoring, evaluation, and performance data. Significant opportunities exist in generating safer roads, vehicles, and users, and improved post-crash response—these need to be specified in a strategic document and evidence-based plans put in place and delivered.

Good national road safety strategies focus on the vital few issues to tackle and incorporate the following essential elements:

- An ultimate vision, which provides purpose, meaning, and a rallying point for all stakeholders to remind them of what is being sought
- A set of performance targets, which go beyond headline injury numbers and establish a performance management framework, that all activity needs to be oriented toward
- Clearly defined strategic directions, which evidence suggests have a strong likelihood of achieving the set safety performance targets
- Ongoing implementation arrangements, including governance and coordination arrangements, planning and funding, and M&E activities
- High-value actions, clearly described, with assigned agency responsibility, time frame, and a funding system that supports delivery.
Recommendation 2

It is recommended that countries review alignment with good practice road safety strategies and plans and ensure that core interventions (the safety quality of roads, of vehicles, and of users, and improved post-crash response) are appropriately applied to the local context—special consideration is required of the political and cultural context in each country, the economic and commercial factors at play, the importance of compliance with safety standards, and appropriate licensing arrangements for informal/public transport.

It is also recommended that countries do the following:

**R2.1:** Continue to develop/renew/update national road safety strategies (recommended as 10 years duration, or with 2030 global target date) and action plans (recommended as 2–4 years duration), which are in line with the Safe System approach, the Global Plan for the Second Decade of Action for Road Safety, and the local context.

**R2.2:** Develop/review/update reports on the national impact of road crashes and the social costs of crashes to support safety-focused decision-making mechanisms and enable comparison with other social, economic, and environmental issues.

**R2.3:** Develop a national road safety performance management framework and associated M&E system that links interventions to achievement of intermediate road safety performance targets, and interim fatality and serious injury reduction targets.

**R2.4:** Provide necessary technical assistance and support for stakeholders (both internal and external to government) to develop safety performance measures for their own activities that are linked to the national road safety strategy.

Given the critical role of good practice legislation and enforcement in road safety strategies, lead agencies should also particularly consider the following recommendations:

**R2.5:** Revise speed limits to simplify them, aligning them with the safe speed thresholds required to eliminate serious road traffic injury, and introduce legislation that facilitates setting and enforcing safe speed limits.

**R2.6:** Review existing regulations relating to drink driving, speeding, restraint and motor cycle helmet use, and mobile phone use in line with global norms promoted by the World Health Organization, and the enforcement of these behavioral standards.

**R2.7:** Review fines and penalties for violations of key safety standards, modifying them to reflect the associated risk of death and serious injury, and develop and implement administrative justice systems that assist in deterring unsafe behaviors.

**R2.8:** Review existing regulations relating to the safety of motor vehicles, including the safety standards required for motor vehicles entering the national fleet, periodic inspection to maintain safety standards, and enforcement of these vehicle safety standards.
Lesson 3: Coordination

Establishing and maintaining stakeholder engagement processes is time-consuming and difficult, but it is essential to the long-term value that the RSLA can deliver.

RSLAs based in government departments appear to be more susceptible to weaker coordination and delivery mechanisms for road safety—they can be effective, but it may be harder. There is weak stakeholder engagement especially between RSLAs and nonstate actors. Nonstate actors broaden engagement and bring synergy in road safety interventions, yet they are not well integrated in road safety governance. Coordination is better among MDA, but any overlapping responsibilities without efficient coordination undermine an RSLA’s performance.

There appears to be a disconnect between government and nongovernment interests. RSLAs generally appear to work effectively with MDA, but much better connections need to be made with road safety interests outside of government. Better opportunities need to be found for the private sector and for civil society organizations to become a key part of the national road safety effort. Organizations outside government are making safety part of their business, and they represent a critical constituency for the RSLA as they seek to increase understanding of road safety with the community, and acceptance and support for new safety policies and investments.

Recommendation 3

It is recommended that countries strengthen road safety governance arrangements to ensure that nonstate actors in the academic, business, and community sectors are engaged in developing and implementing a road safety strategy and can better align their own safety interests and activities to the directions being pursued at a national level.

It is also recommended that countries do the following:

R3.1: Review the current status of arrangements with all stakeholders in society (both inside and outside government) and develop an initial priority list to engage more stakeholders.

R3.2: Review the extent to which national, regional, and local government and nongovernment actors are incorporated into coordination arrangements, and strengthen such arrangements as necessary.

R3.3: Establish working groups on technical or policy issues to draw upon technical expertise and stakeholder support for developing and implementing significant new road safety reforms.

R3.4: Ensure that all stakeholder’s activities are linked to the overall road safety strategy.
**Lesson 4: Funding**

Sustainable funding sources for the RSLA and for the safety programs being delivered by other MDA need to be considered as a critical governance and institutional issue. Countries are seeking technical assistance from multilateral banks and foreign donors. However, the responsibilities swing both ways. Funding is largely provided by national treasuries and responsible ministries. Nine countries have road funds, but only Morocco had sufficient budget for 2020/21. A critical role for the lead agency is to lead analysis and discussion on what significant additional safety investments are required, how they will be funded, and how they will be managed.

Large externally funded safety projects can play an essential role in making infrastructure safe, in developing more sustainable and safe public transport systems, and in providing quicker and better emergency response to crashes. When those projects stop, however, the work carries on. Ongoing, internal sources of revenue for safety are critical. This means making the economic safety case for portions of fuel levies and insurance premiums. It also means that regulatory charges relating to transport operators, motor vehicles, and drivers at least meet the cost of delivering safe regulatory systems. In doing so, an RSLA must also have the capacity to estimate its real investment needs and the safety investment needs of the sector as a whole.

**Recommendation 4**

It is recommended that countries pursue more sustainable funding sources and greater priority for safety investments, which are needed to reduce the significant funding gap reported by almost all RSLAs, and for the wider sector (in road infrastructure, vehicle regulation, post-crash services, and so on) to meet the established national road safety targets.

It is also recommended that countries do the following:

**R4.1:** Identify the economic cost of road traffic crashes as well as the financial and human resources required to establish and sustain the RSLA and to implement the national road safety strategy/action plan across all government agencies.

**R4.2:** Identify potential funding sources for road safety focusing on internal government regulated sources—such as fuel levies, insurance premiums, vehicle/driver regulatory fees, traffic fines, and major infrastructure investment or international development organizations—and initiate a feasibility study for a national road safety fund to be managed by the lead agency.

**R4.3:** Develop business cases, with sustainable funding sources, for investment in strengthening the RSLA and delivering more and better interventions—for example, road safety management capacity building, road crash data systems and associated evaluation and research activity, infrastructure safety investments, investments in driver and vehicle regulation and enforcement, and post-crash response.
Lesson 5: Monitoring and Evaluation

Direct involvement in road safety data management is important for RSLAs to deliver their wider leadership role.

Research findings reveal poor road safety data systems. Most RSLAs consider death and injury reporting to be inaccurate, and they rated the compilation and dissemination of national road safety statistics as poor. Some RSLAs are taking substantial steps to address issues of data and information systems, and the first step is to fully recognize the scale of the data problem. Current data systems mean that the public can be unintentionally misled about the shocking impact of unsafe road traffic systems on the community. Good data systems require sustained and ongoing operational expenditure to be maintained, usually for some years after initial capital expenditure is made.

Recommendation 5

It is recommended that countries strengthen RSLA capacity to effectively collect and manage road safety data, and that they develop a reliable evaluation and monitoring system to promote safety performance indicators—while privacy controls are essential, all government stakeholders need to share data, and performance data need to be regularly published.

It is also recommended that countries do the following:

R5.1: Develop and operationalize an electronic national road crash database to effectively collect and manage road safety data in line with good practice and the African Road Safety Observatory requirements, and including interagency coordination mechanisms for collecting data, and for drawing information from various sources such as infrastructure, vehicle registration, and driving license.

R5.2: Develop and operationalize mechanisms for sharing data across relevant MDA and research organizations for the purpose of developing, implementing, and evaluating the most effective countermeasures.

R5.3: Support and promote national and regional road safety observatories (such as the African Road Safety Observatory) to support the capture of standardized road safety data and reporting, contribute to evidence-based road safety efforts, set appropriate performance measures, and improve accountability of all road safety stakeholders.

R5.4: Develop baseline measures for key risk factors (such as iRAP safety star ratings, traffic speed, drink driving, and so on), an annual M&E organization to monitor progress toward targets, and the regular publication of road safety performance reports.
Lesson 6: Capacity Building

Capacity building is a critical and ongoing consideration as the RSLA is established, grows, and leads the national road safety effort.

At one level, a shortfall is observed between the number of positions established in RSLAs and the number of people actually employed—Ghana’s National Road Safety Authority, for example, employs only a third of the technical staff in its establishment. The agencies are partially closing the gap using local consultants, but a basic lack of financial resources is impacting on human resources, and the human resource needs are great. RSLAs need to be able to attract leaders capable of engaging at the highest levels on critical safety issues related to law and public policy, roads and traffic engineering, mechanical engineering, enforcement and behavior change, research and evaluation, and funding and investment—even if they are not specifically qualified in each discipline. Significant gaps remain also in relation to system resources, such as data management.

Where significant safety investments are being made in countries, it is critical to consider how the investment will directly strengthen the RSLA leadership of road safety and the wider national road safety management system within which all stakeholders work. The stakeholder focus group discussions conducted for this study reinforced the considerable support and intense interest among stakeholders for tackling the road traffic injury crisis sweeping across Africa. Funding must focus on the much more difficult and intangible capacity building for road safety as much as, if not more than, on delivering projects that can be touched or seen.

Recommendation 6

It is recommended that countries look for opportunities to systematically strengthen capacity building in local and national safety expertise, focusing on the quality of human resources and their technical expertise and on the capacity of the national road safety management system rather than on the number of staff.

It is also recommended that countries do the following:

R6.1: Develop, adopt, and implement a funded national road safety capacity-building program, involving road safety governance and leadership organizations for key government agencies and technical education organizations, and learning-by-doing processes to progressively strengthen key road safety policies and organizations.

R6.2: Develop and deliver road traffic safety courses for all people working in road safety, aligned with their professional responsibilities.

R6.3: Conduct special training for management and operation of databases, including statistical analysis, and ongoing training for collecting good quality road safety data.

R6.4: Strengthen road safety technical guidelines and develop personnel with a higher level of understanding and skills associated with good practice in road safety engineering and policing.

R6.5: In a collaboration between the RSLA, ministries, universities, and other research institutions, identify gaps in road safety education (including postgraduate) and research, develop and execute a research agenda, and explore opportunities to establish a formal national road safety research center linked to the African Road Safety Observatory.

R6.7: Establish and adopt a “knowledge transfer” strategy that provides new information and research to all agencies, partners, and stakeholders.
APPENDIX A: 
RSLA QUESTIONNAIRE

Introduction
The African Development Bank and the World Bank have commissioned a study of 16 African countries. The overall research objective of the study is to assess the organizational performance of road safety lead agencies (RSLAs) in Africa in order to generate knowledge on the strengths and weaknesses of road safety institutions, and identify possible interventions to improve performance.

The questionnaire is focused on organizations which are designated as the RSLA in each country. In cases where the RSLA cannot fully respond to some questions, the questions can be directed by the RSLA to the appropriate government department or agency. An ideal method of responding to the instrument is to have a roundtable involving all relevant departments of the RSLA and any other relevant stakeholder(s).

1. Institutional Information of the RSLA
These questions refer to the agency which is designated as the government agency responsible for leading the national road safety effort.

Name of Country:
Name of Organization:
Year of Establishment:
Year Operations Effectively Began:
Website:
Contact Person:
   Position:
   Email:
   Telephone No:

2. Legal framework of the RSLA
These questions refer to the agency which is designated as the government agency responsible for leading the national road safety effort.

2.1. Is the RSLA established under a specific law? Yes/No (Please provide a link or soft copy if possible.)

2.2. If yes, list the functions of the RSLA specified under law:
   a)
   b)
   c)
   d) ... 

2.3. Please also list any other function of the RSLA not specified under law:
   a)
   b)

2.4. If no, is there a road safety policy document that guides the RSLA’s operations? Yes/No (Please provide a link or soft copy if possible.)

2.5. If yes, what are the stated objectives of the road safety policy document which are relevant to the RSLA?
   a)
   b)
   c)
   d) ...
2.6. Specify the institutional form of the RSLA:
   a) A government department
   b) A stand-alone autonomous agency
   c) A council with a professional secretariat
   d) Other (Please specify the legal form of the RSLA and any supervising organization.)

3. Organization of the RSLA

3.1. Please list the departments/units of the RSLA, their functions, staff and budget:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of unit</th>
<th>Unit functions</th>
<th>Technical staff</th>
<th>Support staff</th>
<th>Annual budget*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Most recent annual figure to illustrate breakdown of budget across RSLA functions

3.2. Which of these departments/units is responsible for leading the national road safety effort?

3.3. Aside from the national office, are there any regional or local offices? Yes/No

3.4. If yes, specify the number of regional and local offices:
   (a) Regional:
   (b) Local:

3.5 How many technical staff are in regional or local offices?
   (c) Regional:
   (d) Local:

4. National inter-agency body

These questions refer to an inter-agency body (such as a National Road Safety Committee) which provides advice to government and coordinates national planning and activity across stakeholders.

4.1. Is there a body which acts as a national inter-agency body for road safety? Yes/No

4.2. If yes:
   (a) Is it established under law? Yes/No (Please provide a link or soft copy if possible.)
   (b) Does it have a terms of reference? Yes/No (Please provide a link or soft copy if possible.)
   (c) What is the relationship of the national inter-agency body with the RSLA? For example, does the RSLA provide administrative and technical secretariat services?

4.3. Please specify the formal inter-agency bodies for road safety in your country, whether they are national or regional or technical in nature, established under law, and have been operationalized. Please also rate their effectiveness (using a scale of 1 for least effective and 5 for most effective).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal inter-agency bodies</th>
<th>National? Regional? Technical?</th>
<th>Established under law? Yes/No</th>
<th>Real meeting frequency?</th>
<th>Operational? Yes/No</th>
<th>Level of effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1. 2. 3. 4. 5.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
5. Coordination

These questions relate to the role of the RSLA in coordinating various government and non-government stakeholders.

5.1. Does the law provide the RSLA with a coordination mandate for all government and non-government stakeholders in order to achieve road safety goals? Yes/No

5.2. Please explain how the RSLA works with other government agencies (such as transport, highways, police, health and education agencies) to ensure a coordinated government response to the following:
   (a) Safe roads
   (b) User safety
   (c) Safe vehicles
   (d) Post-crash
   (e) Overall implementation of national road safety strategy
   (f) Overall achievement of national road safety targets

5.3. Is there an agreed work organization for road safety among stakeholders? Yes/No

5.4. Do other government agencies include road safety objectives in their strategies and plans? Yes/No

5.5. Please rate the effectiveness of RSLA coordination with the following stakeholders to help achieve national road safety goals (using a scale of 1 for least effective and 5 for most effective)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders helping achieve national road safety goals</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-level political offices (presidency, Parliament, local governments)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior (including police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional/Local/City governments</td>
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<td>Ministry of Health (including hospitals)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traffic Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society organizations working on road safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other community or private sector organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development partners supporting road safety efforts</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


6.1. Is there a national road safety strategy or action plan? Yes/No

6.2. If yes, is it aligned with United Nations or African Union frameworks, such as:
   (a) Sustainable Development Goals Yes/No
   (b) UN Decade of Action Yes/No
   (c) African Road Safety Action Plan Yes/No

6.3. Does the national road safety strategy or action plan have a vision for road safety? Yes/No
   (a) If yes, please specify ____________________________

6.4. Have any specific targets been set in the national road safety strategy or action plan? Yes/No

6.5. If yes:
   (a) Do these targets relate to deaths, injuries or hospitalizations? Yes/No Please specify ...
   (b) Do these targets relate to infrastructure, vehicle, user safety or post-crash related intermediate and final outcome targets? Yes/No Please specify ...
   (c) Do these targets relate to delivery of road safety projects/programs? Yes/No Please specify ...
   (d) Is responsibility for these targets assigned to different agencies? Yes/No If yes, how does the RSLA monitor delivery of actions by different agencies?
6.6. What year was this strategy or action plan approved by government?

6.7. Was funding for this strategy or action plan also approved by government? Yes/No

6.8. Has implementation of the strategy or action plan been evaluated? Yes/No

6.9. How does the RSLA monitor implementation of the strategy or action plan?

6.10. Does the RSLA have its own organizational strategy or activity plan? Yes/No (Please provide a link or soft copy if possible.)

6.11. Does the RSLA strategy or plan refer to:
   (a) The national road safety or action plan? Yes/No
   (b) A vision or targets for road safety? Yes/No
   (c) The need for partnerships or coordination with other government and non-government stakeholders? Yes/No

6.12. Who developed the RSLA’s strategic plan and/or business plan? (Please select from list below.)
   (a) Internal RSLA team
   (b) Internal team supported by local consultants
   (c) Internal team supported by foreign consultants
   (d) Local consultants
   (e) Foreign consultants
   (f) Other, please specify: __________________________

6.13. Does the RSLA produce an annual activity report? Yes/No (Please provide the a link or soft copy.)

7. Legislation

7.1. Does the RSLA periodically review legislation, rules and standards against best practices, and recommendations for improvement? Yes/No

7.2. If yes, please specify how many reviews have been made during the last six years and areas of focus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of review</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Relevant instruments (act, regulations, standards, other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road user behaviors (e.g., speeding, drink driving, use of helmets/seatbelts/mobile phones), enforcement, information, education, campaigns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Driver licensing (testing/issue/regulation), and commercial transport safety regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle safety (e.g., safety regulations for importing or constructing vehicles, or for vehicle roadworthiness/registration)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure safety (e.g., requirements for road agency to provide safe roads, or undertake road safety inspections and audits)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road safety management (e.g., establishment of lead agency, preparation of strategies or plans, road safety funding)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-crash care (e.g., good Samaritan laws, injury insurance schemes)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
8. Data

These questions relate to data which is required for efficient monitoring, evaluation and performance management.

8.1. Please explain how data is collected and shared with key stakeholders and the general public, including the role of the RSLA in this.

8.2. Which type of data is gathered, monitored and shared across different agencies? Specify agency responsible for gathering data and whether data is shared:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of data collected &amp; shared</th>
<th>Data collected (Yes/No)</th>
<th>Agency responsible (mark x if no agency responsible)</th>
<th>Data shared (Yes/No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road crash deaths</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Road crash injuries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hospitalized road crash victims</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance with speed limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance with seat belt law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance with drink driving law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance with motorcycle helmet law</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance with mobile phone law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compliance with child restraint law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other, specify</td>
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</table>

8.3. Please provide officially registered/recorded data as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road crash deaths</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road crash injuries</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

8.4. Does the RSLA produce a periodic road crash record/analysis report, or seek the responsible agency to produce one for it? Yes/No If yes, please provide a link or a soft copy.

8.5. What is the official definition of a road death?
   (a) Died within 30 days of the road crash
   (b) Other, please specify:

8.6. If the RSLA is not responsible for collecting data, does the agency have any role in specifying the type of data being collected? Yes/No

8.7. Does the RSLA consider death and injury reporting in the country accurate? Yes/No

8.8. If no, what actions are being taken by the RSLA to improve death and injury reporting?

8.9. Is there consideration of a centralized police and hospital data system coordinated by the RSLA? Yes/No

8.10. Does the RSLA regularly analyze data to understand the contributory factors, causes, and consequences of road traffic deaths and injuries, in order to improve strategies and interventions? Yes/No

8.11. How does the RSLA use the data generated to improve its mandated road safety functions?
9. Monitoring and evaluation

These questions relate to key performance indicators and related targets which have been set for performance management purposes.

9.1. Please list the indicators or targets which have been set either by the RSLA internally, or as part of a national strategy or action plan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results hierarchy</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final safety outcomes</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serious Injuries</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hospitalizations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic cost of crashes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety performance outcomes</td>
<td>Roads at least 3 star safety rated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction of drivers exceeding speed limit</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduction of drivers above drink limit BAC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduction of passengers not wearing seat belts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduction of motorcyclists not wearing helmets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increase of child restraint usage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional delivery/outputs</td>
<td>Please specify—for example:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Fines issued</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hazardous locations treated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Speed limits reduced</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9.2. Are all the indicators and/or targets listed above referenced in the national strategy/plan or the RSLA’s organizational strategy/plan? Yes/No

9.3. Does the RSLA periodically evaluate road safety interventions, in order to justify and/or adjust road safety organizations and strategies? Yes/No

9.4. If yes,
   (a) What interventions have been planned and implemented during the last five years?
   (b) Please list the most recent evaluations conducted (within the last five years)...
   (c) Please indicate who conducted the evaluation (e.g., internal staff local/foreign consultants, etc.)
   (d) Please indicate who paid for the evaluation (e.g., RSLA, development partner, other)

10. Funding

10.1. Please indicate the revenue sources to fund the RSLA budget:
   (a) National budget Yes/No
   (b) Fuel levy Yes/No
   (c) Insurance levy Yes/No
   (d) Fees and charges Yes/No
   (e) Fines Yes/No
   (f) Other, please specify: ________________________________

10.2. Please indicate the institutional sources to fund the RSLA budget:
   (a) National treasury Yes/No
   (b) Responsible ministry Yes/No
   (c) National road fund Yes/No
   (d) Other, please specify: ________________________________
10.3. Please specify the amount allocated to the RSLA for road safety activity in:
(a) 2018/2019:
(b) 2019/2020:
(c) 2020/2021:

10.4. Is the RSLA annual budget in 2020/2021 sufficient to deliver mandated functions? Yes/No

10.5. If no, what proportion of the required resources does the budget comprise?
(a) Less than 50 percent
(b) 50-75 percent
(c) 75-95 percent

10.6. Is there a National Road Safety Fund, or a specific road safety component of a Road Fund if any, which can be used to fund road safety activity by the RSLA, or stakeholders? Yes/No

10.7. If yes, please specify the amount allocated by this fund in:
(a) 2018/2019:
(b) 2019/2020:
(c) 2020/2021:

10.8. What types of institutions/funders directly or indirectly finance road safety projects/studies in your country?
(a) Private sector: please estimate the percentage
(b) Multilateral development banks: please estimate the percentage

10.9. Please rank funding priorities (from 1 to 10), and provide a justification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Priority ranking (1-10)</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of activities and stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategy and planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of laws, policies, and standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Data collection and analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel and capacity building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding and investment bids</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Road safety advocacy and information</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enforcement of laws and standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Infrastructure improvement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-crash response activity</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

11. Human Resources

11.1. Do your technical staff have university qualifications in the following disciplines?
(a) Law or public policy Yes/No
(b) Research or evaluation Yes/No
(c) Roads or traffic engineering Yes/No
(d) Mechanical engineers Yes/No
(e) Marketing or education Yes/No
(f) Other, please specify

11.2. Is there a shortfall between establishment staff and employed staff? Yes/No If so, please specify the number.

11.3. If so, how does the agency fulfill its mandate and achieve targets?
(a) Mandate and targets only partially fulfilled
(b) Use of consultants paid by development partners
(c) Use of local consultants paid by the RSLA
(d) Outsourcing to other stakeholders
(e) Engagement of interns and volunteers to support some tasks
(f) Other, please specify
11.4. Is there a plan to ensure that all established staff positions in the LRSA are filled? Yes/No

11.5. What issues exist in employing technical staff as stated in the establishment?
(a) National budget constraints
(b) Competition for scarce resources by different road safety agencies
(c) Lack of commitment to road safety goals by high level decision makers
(d) Ineffective lobbying at national level for resources by the RSLA
(e) Inefficient mobilization of internal and external resources by the RSLA
(f) Lack of training manpower in road safety
(g) Other, please specify

12. RSLA Performance

12.1. Score the following constraining factors affecting performance of RSLAs (1 for least problematic to 5 for most problematic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraining factors</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of legal empowerment of RSLA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of up-to-date road safety legislation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Funding constraints</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance constraints – e.g., inter-agency relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>System constraints – e.g., management, infrastructure, regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical constraints – lack of knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical constraints – lack of professional staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technical constraints – lack of data</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ineffective enforcement of regulations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other, specify</td>
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</table>

12.2. Score the performance of the RSLA on the following functions (1 for least positive to 5 for most positive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance of functions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marshalling all road safety efforts towards achieving road safety results</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinating road safety decision making across central government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinating road safety activities of various government agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinating road safety activities across different levels of government (national, regional, and local)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinating road safety activities between government and other stakeholders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pursuing inclusive road safety legislative framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocating for and safeguarding road safety funding across government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managing resource allocation of available road safety funding</td>
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<td>Promoting effective road safety activities by government and other stakeholders</td>
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<td>Promoting road safety within the community</td>
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<td>Systematic monitoring, evaluation and reporting of road safety performance</td>
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<td>Establishing and supporting data systems that are used to monitor progress</td>
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<td>Compilation and dissemination of national road safety statistics</td>
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<td>Strategic road safety research and knowledge transfer</td>
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<td>Other, specify</td>
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APPENDIX B:
STAKEHOLDER FOCUS GROUP CHECKLIST

Introduction
The African Development Bank and the World Bank have commissioned a study of 16 African countries. The overall research objective of the study is to assess the organizational performance of road safety lead agencies (RSLAs) in Africa in order to generate knowledge on the strengths and weaknesses of road safety institutions and identify possible interventions to improve performance. The study is using two main methods of primary information gathering—a questionnaire directed to RSLAs and focus group discussions (FGDs) for road safety stakeholders in each of the 16 countries.

The FGDs are aimed at bringing together road safety stakeholders to discuss issues relating to road safety, in particular coordination and governance of road safety activities in each country by the RSLA. Through the FGD, some issues raised in a questionnaire dedicated to the RSLA are given deeper reflections by key road safety stakeholders. The discussion should be free with every participant contributing to issues of discussion. Participants should give consent for recording and taking of pictures before proceedings begin, which will enhance preparation of discussion notes.

1. Familiarity with road safety issues
   1.1. Participants’ general views on status of road safety in country
       - Views on crashes, injuries, hospitalization, and death
       - Post-crash handling
       - Infrastructure, vehicle and user safety
       - Legislation and enforcement of regulations

2. National Road Safety Strategy and Targets
   2.1. Stakeholders’ awareness of the national road safety strategy and targets
       - Sources of information, actions at stakeholder levels towards implementation of strategy and targets
       - Insights on the feasibility of road safety strategy and targets
       - Stakeholder engagement with RSLA and other government agencies implementing strategy and targets
   2.2. Responsiveness of stakeholders and government agencies towards implementation of the strategy and achievement of targets
       - Discuss how stakeholders are engaged, and how overall coordination of actors is done

3. Engagement with road safety agencies (probe the following)
   3.1. Knowledge of road safety activities of various government agencies
   3.2. Coordination among various government agencies
   3.3. Collaboration of road safety agencies with other road safety stakeholders
   3.4. Presence of an inter-agency body for road safety, such as a National Road Safety Council, involving various government agencies
   3.5. Profile and effectiveness of the inter-agency body for road safety
4. **Stakeholder engagement with RSLA (probe the following)**

4.1. Knowledge of the country’s RSLA and its responsibilities

4.2. Assess how stakeholders’ support the RSLA in achieving national road safety goals

4.3. Level of engagement of stakeholders in RSLA activities (probe whether as participants, technical, financier, and campaign agents, among others)

- Development or delivery of strategies and plans
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Public road safety campaigns

5. **Coordination of road safety actors by RSLA**

5.1. Discuss coordination of road safety actors by the RSLA at three levels

- National (probe the role of RSLA in coordination of different government agencies—ministries of transport, infrastructure, health, education, police, internal affairs, etc.—involved in road safety and general performance)
- Regional (probe whether there are RSLA regional offices, the level of coordination—knowing who the actors are, what they their activities on road safety and outcome of their road safety activities—of stakeholders and general performance of RSLA)
- Local (probe whether there are RSLA local offices, the general coordination—knowing who the actors, what they are doing on road safety and outcome of their road safety activities—of stakeholders and general performance of RSLA in coordination of actors)

5.2. Probe overall coordination by the RSLA in respect to planning, supervision, allocation of responsibilities, organizations, budget allocations in the following areas:

- Infrastructure safety
- Vehicle safety
- Road crash data recording (police, hospital)
- Speeding
- Drink driving
- Seat belts
- Motorcycle helmets
- Mobile phone use
- Child restraints
- Driver training, testing and licensing
- Police enforcement
- Post-crash response

5.3. Probe how conflicts and disputes of coordination are resolved by the RSLA

5.4. Probe experiences and lessons of coordination by RSLA from the perspectives of the stakeholders

6. **Road safety information data gathering and sharing**

6.1. Probe whether stakeholders’ activities are informed by data and knowledge-based information

6.2. Probe use of data to inform road safety activities of stakeholders, highlighting:

- Sources of data (including data from RSLA and elsewhere)
- Ease of access (websites, available but not compiled and analyzed, physical visit to data centers)
- Adequacy of available data
- Gaps in data (probe actual gaps and how stakeholders fill the gap)
7. Road safety funding and technical support
7.1. Probe sources of funding for road safety in general and for the RSLA
7.2. Probe role of development partners in funding and technical support to RSLA
7.3. Probe role of CSOs in technical support and road safety campaigns organized by RSLA
7.4. Probe the key areas stakeholders think should be prioritized for road safety funding by the RSLA

8. Overall assessment of RSLA performance
8.1. Coordination of road safety activities among stakeholders, including development partners
8.2. Coordination of government ministries and agencies
8.3. Overall leadership of road safety towards achieving national road safety goals
8.4. Major road safety issues which the RSLA should focus on

9. Questions and any further sharing on the role of RSLA in country
APPENDIX C: LEGAL MANDATES FOR ROAD SAFETY LEAD AGENCIES

National road safety lead agencies (RSLAs) can only be expected to deliver against the legal mandate under which they work. Based on the data collected and provided, an assessment was made of the strength of that mandate against the functions of a national lead agency as used in the study. This assessment relates to the legislative provisions that the RSLA is working to, not to performance against those provisions. It does not relate to other functions performed by the RSLA, most commonly motor vehicle regulation. Countries are encouraged to consider the strength of the mandate provided to the RSLA across the seven road safety institutional management functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead Agency Function</th>
<th>Weak Mandate</th>
<th>Moderate Mandate</th>
<th>Strong Mandate</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results focus</td>
<td>No legislative reference to overall leadership of road safety, strategy, and planning and reduction in road trauma</td>
<td>Specific legislative reference to overall leadership of road safety, strategy, and planning and reduction in road trauma</td>
<td>Specific legislative reference to overall leadership of road safety, strategy, and planning, and reduction in road trauma, demonstrably acted upon and/or referenced by stakeholders</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>Legislation</td>
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<td>Funding</td>
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<td>Specific legislative reference to establishment or management of government safety budgets</td>
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<td>Promotion</td>
<td>No legislative reference to road safety advocacy or promotion of safety as major societal issue</td>
<td>Specific legislative reference to road safety advocacy or promotion of safety as major societal issue</td>
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<td>Monitoring and evaluation (M&amp;E)</td>
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<td>Research and development (R&amp;D)</td>
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Décret No 2012/250 du 1 juin 2012

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Loi No 003/PR/2017

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Ordonnance No 78-478 du 26 décembre 1978

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No known legal mandate

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Council of Ministers Regulation No. 205/2011
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National Road Safety Authority Act 2019 // *Identified in survey as government department

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National Transport and Safety Act 2012 // *Identified in survey as government department

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Ordonnance No 09-003/P-RM du 09 février 2009

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<td>Autonomous agency</td>
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Dahir No 1-18-16 du 5 journada Il 1439 (22 février 2018)

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Decreto No 47/2021 de 5 de Julho
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**Overall mandate**
- Namibia: Moderate
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Moderate
- Tunisia: Moderate
- Uganda: Moderate

**Coordination**
- Namibia: Strong
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Strong
- Tunisia: Weak
- Uganda: Moderate

**Promotion**
- Namibia: Strong
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Strong
- Tunisia: Moderate
- Uganda: Moderate

**M&E**
- Namibia: Strong
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Strong
- Tunisia: Moderate
- Uganda: Moderate

**Results focus**
- Namibia: Weak
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Strong
- Tunisia: Moderate
- Uganda: Weak

**Legislation**
- Namibia: Weak
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Weak
- Tunisia: Weak
- Uganda: Strong

**Funding**
- Namibia: Weak
- Nigeria: Weak
- South Africa: Weak
- Tunisia: Moderate
- Uganda: Weak

**R&D**
- Namibia: Strong
- Nigeria: Strong
- South Africa: Strong
- Tunisia: Moderate
- Uganda: Moderate

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National Road Safety Act 1972


Road Traffic Management Corporation Act 1999

Décret No 2003-2666 du 29 décembre 2003

Traffic and Road Safety Act 1998 (Amendment) Act 2020
REFERENCES


